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Spillover Effects of Peer Incentives on Co-Worker Productivity: Evidence from Patent Examiner Target Difficulty.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Spillover Effects of Peer Incentives on Co-Worker Productivity: Evidence from Patent Examiner Target Difficulty./
Author:	Sprecher, Caroline.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2022,
Description:	51 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-11A.
Subject:	Intellectual property. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29064256
ISBN:	9798438798521

Spillover Effects of Peer Incentives on Co-Worker Productivity: Evidence from Patent Examiner Target Difficulty.
Sprecher, Caroline.

Spillover Effects of Peer Incentives on Co-Worker Productivity: Evidence from Patent Examiner Target Difficulty. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2022 - 51 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2022.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

I investigate the effect of worker incentives on their co-worker's productivity, in a setting in which they work on independent tasks. According to goal setting theory, when a patent examiner's target difficulty increases, her productivity will also increase. Co-workers, feeling pressured to keep up, may increase their own productivity in response. Simultaneously, in an effort to meet her more challenging performance target, the examiner may request more help from her co-workers or spend less time helping them, causing a decrease in her co-workers' productivity. To investigate this question, I estimate a difference-in-differences design using internal United States Patent and Trademark Office data on patent examiners' incentives, output, and working groups. I find that a patent examiner's increase in target difficulty causes a decrease in her co-workers' productivity. This decrease is attributable to the examiner requesting additional help from her co-workers which detracts from the time they have to spend on their own tasks. These results suggest that individual worker incentives can negatively affect coworker's productivity, even when they work on independent tasks.

ISBN: 9798438798521Subjects--Topical Terms:

572975
Intellectual property.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Spillover effects

Spillover Effects of Peer Incentives on Co-Worker Productivity: Evidence from Patent Examiner Target Difficulty.
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245 1 0 $a Spillover Effects of Peer Incentives on Co-Worker Productivity: Evidence from Patent Examiner Target Difficulty.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2022
300 $a 51 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Glaeser, Stephen;Lang, Mark.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2022.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a I investigate the effect of worker incentives on their co-worker's productivity, in a setting in which they work on independent tasks. According to goal setting theory, when a patent examiner's target difficulty increases, her productivity will also increase. Co-workers, feeling pressured to keep up, may increase their own productivity in response. Simultaneously, in an effort to meet her more challenging performance target, the examiner may request more help from her co-workers or spend less time helping them, causing a decrease in her co-workers' productivity. To investigate this question, I estimate a difference-in-differences design using internal United States Patent and Trademark Office data on patent examiners' incentives, output, and working groups. I find that a patent examiner's increase in target difficulty causes a decrease in her co-workers' productivity. This decrease is attributable to the examiner requesting additional help from her co-workers which detracts from the time they have to spend on their own tasks. These results suggest that individual worker incentives can negatively affect coworker's productivity, even when they work on independent tasks.
590 $a School code: 0153.
650 4 $a Intellectual property. $3 572975
653 $a Spillover effects
653 $a Peer incentives
653 $a Co-worker productivity
653 $a Patent examiner
653 $a Target difficulty
690 $a 0510
690 $a 0513
690 $a 0272
710 2 $a The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. $b Business Administration. $3 1026784
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-11A.
790 $a 0153
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2022
793 $a English
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