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Essays in Public Economics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Public Economics./
作者:	Andersen, Eric William.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	197 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02A.
標題:	Public administration. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28497350
ISBN:	9798534672732

Essays in Public Economics.
Andersen, Eric William.

Essays in Public Economics. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 197 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation consists of three independent essays on public auctions.The first essay studies the impact of small order exemptions from competitive procurement on the distribution of contract sizes. The procuring entity in Chicago responds to legal restrictions on the size of contracts that can be exempted from the costly competitive procurement process by designing contracts in order to keep their size below the legal threshold. This breaking down of contracts does not appear to be caused by political interference.The second essay studies the bid exclusion in public procurement auctions. Procurement officers in the City of Chicago have the legal discretion to exclude the lowest bidding firm in a first-price auction if they deem the bidder is not "responsive and responsible." Bureaucrats execrise this discretio frequently and use it to erect barriers to entry for firms based outside of Chicago and for firms with no prior business with the City. Using a structural model estimated on auction data from 2000 through the present, the strategic response of firms increases the total cost of the bid exclusion to the City by more than double.The final essay studies within-teacher differences in the ability to teach student subgroups, i.e. Black and white students. The typical constant teacher effects assumption is relaxed and allowed to differ based on a binary student characteristics. Using data from elementary school exams in North Carolina, teacher causal effect differentials are estimated and the hypothesis that teachers do not have differences in their impacts between student groups is rejected. These differences are largest on reading test scores and across race (vs. gender). Teachers' causal effect differential estimates are consistent with student-teacher match effects.

ISBN: 9798534672732Subjects--Topical Terms:

531287
Public administration.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Public auctions

Essays in Public Economics.
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245 1 0 $a Essays in Public Economics.
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300 $a 197 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Hendren, Nathaniel.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three independent essays on public auctions.The first essay studies the impact of small order exemptions from competitive procurement on the distribution of contract sizes. The procuring entity in Chicago responds to legal restrictions on the size of contracts that can be exempted from the costly competitive procurement process by designing contracts in order to keep their size below the legal threshold. This breaking down of contracts does not appear to be caused by political interference.The second essay studies the bid exclusion in public procurement auctions. Procurement officers in the City of Chicago have the legal discretion to exclude the lowest bidding firm in a first-price auction if they deem the bidder is not "responsive and responsible." Bureaucrats execrise this discretio frequently and use it to erect barriers to entry for firms based outside of Chicago and for firms with no prior business with the City. Using a structural model estimated on auction data from 2000 through the present, the strategic response of firms increases the total cost of the bid exclusion to the City by more than double.The final essay studies within-teacher differences in the ability to teach student subgroups, i.e. Black and white students. The typical constant teacher effects assumption is relaxed and allowed to differ based on a binary student characteristics. Using data from elementary school exams in North Carolina, teacher causal effect differentials are estimated and the hypothesis that teachers do not have differences in their impacts between student groups is rejected. These differences are largest on reading test scores and across race (vs. gender). Teachers' causal effect differential estimates are consistent with student-teacher match effects.
590 $a School code: 0084.
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650 4 $a Government. $3 3415717
650 4 $a Teacher education. $3 3172312
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650 4 $a Estimates. $3 3561047
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653 $a Public auctions
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790 $a 0084
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792 $a 2021
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856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28497350