東華大學圖書館 |

Essays in Industrial Organization.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Industrial Organization./
作者:	Wang, Yuzhou.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	146 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02B.
標題:	Industrial engineering. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28321936
ISBN:	9798534651713

Essays in Industrial Organization.
Wang, Yuzhou.

Essays in Industrial Organization. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 146 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation studies a few topics in industrial organization. In the first two chapters, I study the education market from the perspective of industrial organization. Chapter 3 studies second-price auctions with participation costs.Chapters 1 and 2 study the high school market of a large city in China that introduced a policy allowing public schools to offer both free and priced admission options within a centralized admission mechanism. Chapter 1 introduces the institutional background, such as details of the admission mechanism, the schools and their price levels, and the new policy. I then present descriptive analysis. I also estimate a high school value-added regression, where I regress exit exam scores on entrance exam scores and other variables. I interpret the value-added as the high school quality. Results show that quality increases after the implementation of the policy. A difference-in-differences regression further shows that top-tier schools are able to increase their value-added more. I use these results as both inputs and motivating facts for my study in Chapter 2.Chapter 2 formally develops a demand and supply model. On the demand side, students consider both their preferences for a school and their probabilities of being admitted to that school to file a report of preferences. I develop an algorithm to quickly find students' optimal reports, and this algorithm helps to reduce the computational burden in demand estimation. On the supply side, I model schools as maximizing a weighted average of profit and quality, so as to allow for the existence of excess demand for good schools. Demand estimation using students' strategic reports quantifies the extent to which students with higher entrance exam scores care more about quality relative to price. Supply side estimation shows that top-tier schools have lower marginal costs of quality and thus choose higher quality. Counterfactual analysis shows that introducing subsidies to low income students while keeping the current priced admission options would give students more equal access to good schools, while keeping the quality gain brought by market incentives. Another counterfactual analysis shows that the quality gain brought by market incentives is driven by an increase in funds to improve quality and schools' preference for quality.Chapter 3 studies equilibria and efficiency in second-price auctions with public participation costs. This is joint work with Jose Antonio Espin-Sanchez and Alvaro Parra. We generalize previous results by allowing arbitrary heterogeneity in bidders' distributions of valuations and in their participation costs. We develop a notion of bidder strength, based on the best response of a bidder when all of her opponents play the same strategy she does. We then show that a herculean equilibrium, in which stronger bidders have a lower participation threshold than weaker bidders, exists in general environments. In other words, the order of bidders given by their strength, which is a non-equilibrium concept and can be easily calculated for each bidder using only one equation, predicts the order of the participation thresholds in a certain equilibrium which exists in general. Combined with a sufficient condition for equilibrium uniqueness that we further provide, bidders' strength points out the direction for finding and simplifies the formulation of the equilibrium. Furthermore, even though all equilibria are ex-post inefficient, an ex-ante efficient equilibrium always exists. Therefore, under the uniqueness condition, the herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game and is ex-ante efficient.

ISBN: 9798534651713Subjects--Topical Terms:

526216
Industrial engineering.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Industrial organization

Essays in Industrial Organization.
LDR:04966nmm a2200433 4500 001 2350013
005 20221020123832.5
008 241004s2021 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798534651713
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28321936
035 $a AAI28321936
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Wang, Yuzhou. $3 3689449
245 1 0 $a Essays in Industrial Organization.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 146 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: Haile, Philip;Berry, Steven.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a This dissertation studies a few topics in industrial organization. In the first two chapters, I study the education market from the perspective of industrial organization. Chapter 3 studies second-price auctions with participation costs.Chapters 1 and 2 study the high school market of a large city in China that introduced a policy allowing public schools to offer both free and priced admission options within a centralized admission mechanism. Chapter 1 introduces the institutional background, such as details of the admission mechanism, the schools and their price levels, and the new policy. I then present descriptive analysis. I also estimate a high school value-added regression, where I regress exit exam scores on entrance exam scores and other variables. I interpret the value-added as the high school quality. Results show that quality increases after the implementation of the policy. A difference-in-differences regression further shows that top-tier schools are able to increase their value-added more. I use these results as both inputs and motivating facts for my study in Chapter 2.Chapter 2 formally develops a demand and supply model. On the demand side, students consider both their preferences for a school and their probabilities of being admitted to that school to file a report of preferences. I develop an algorithm to quickly find students' optimal reports, and this algorithm helps to reduce the computational burden in demand estimation. On the supply side, I model schools as maximizing a weighted average of profit and quality, so as to allow for the existence of excess demand for good schools. Demand estimation using students' strategic reports quantifies the extent to which students with higher entrance exam scores care more about quality relative to price. Supply side estimation shows that top-tier schools have lower marginal costs of quality and thus choose higher quality. Counterfactual analysis shows that introducing subsidies to low income students while keeping the current priced admission options would give students more equal access to good schools, while keeping the quality gain brought by market incentives. Another counterfactual analysis shows that the quality gain brought by market incentives is driven by an increase in funds to improve quality and schools' preference for quality.Chapter 3 studies equilibria and efficiency in second-price auctions with public participation costs. This is joint work with Jose Antonio Espin-Sanchez and Alvaro Parra. We generalize previous results by allowing arbitrary heterogeneity in bidders' distributions of valuations and in their participation costs. We develop a notion of bidder strength, based on the best response of a bidder when all of her opponents play the same strategy she does. We then show that a herculean equilibrium, in which stronger bidders have a lower participation threshold than weaker bidders, exists in general environments. In other words, the order of bidders given by their strength, which is a non-equilibrium concept and can be easily calculated for each bidder using only one equation, predicts the order of the participation thresholds in a certain equilibrium which exists in general. Combined with a sufficient condition for equilibrium uniqueness that we further provide, bidders' strength points out the direction for finding and simplifies the formulation of the equilibrium. Furthermore, even though all equilibria are ex-post inefficient, an ex-ante efficient equilibrium always exists. Therefore, under the uniqueness condition, the herculean equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the game and is ex-ante efficient.
590 $a School code: 0265.
650 4 $a Industrial engineering. $3 526216
650 4 $a Industrial arts education. $3 3173045
650 4 $a Education policy. $3 2191387
650 4 $a Educational evaluation. $3 526425
650 4 $a Education. $3 516579
650 4 $a Teaching. $3 517098
650 4 $a Students. $3 756581
650 4 $a Datasets. $3 3541416
650 4 $a Private schools. $3 1003110
650 4 $a Gender. $3 2001319
650 4 $a Equilibrium. $3 668417
650 4 $a Education market. $3 3689450
650 4 $a Tuition. $3 3561540
650 4 $a Public schools. $3 542577
650 4 $a Dictators. $3 3363850
650 4 $a SAT assessment. $3 3681179
650 4 $a Preferences. $3 3560350
650 4 $a Middle schools. $3 564510
650 4 $a Secondary schools. $2 bicssc $3 1556944
650 4 $a Bids. $3 3561817
653 $a Industrial organization
653 $a Herculean equilibrium
653 $a China
653 $a Centralized admission mechanism
653 $a Bidder
653 $a School preference
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0521
690 $a 0443
690 $a 0515
690 $a 0458
690 $a 0546
710 2 $a Yale University. $b Economics. $3 2093909
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-02B.
790 $a 0265
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28321936