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Nato Nuclear Burden-Sharing Post -Crimea: What Constitutes "Free-Riding"?

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Nato Nuclear Burden-Sharing Post -Crimea: What Constitutes "Free-Riding"?/
作者:	Bell, Robert G.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	304 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-05A.
標題:	Military studies. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28644038
ISBN:	9798492761363

Nato Nuclear Burden-Sharing Post -Crimea: What Constitutes "Free-Riding"?
Bell, Robert G.

Nato Nuclear Burden-Sharing Post -Crimea: What Constitutes "Free-Riding"? - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 304 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University), 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation focuses on a sub-set of nations in NATO - the 11 U.S. allies that are both equipped and eligible to assume operational roles under the Alliance's "nuclear-sharing" arrangements, as constituted at present by the Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) posture. The dissertation seeks to explain why 6 of the 11 have decided to opt-in on this mission, whereas 5 have elected to opt-out. The dissertation examines this question in the context of the late Robert E. Osgood's contention that an alliance is a "latent war community, based on general cooperation that goes beyond formal provisions and that the signatories must continually estimate in order to preserve mutual confidence in each other's fidelity to specified obligations (emphasis added)." The dissertation examines how this "latent war community," the NATO Alliance, defines its members' "specified obligations" to participate, or not, in DCA, and how the Alliance assesses its allies' "fidelity" to these "obligations," in terms of generally-accepted definitions in the literature of "burden-sharing" versus "free-riding."The dissertation employs within-case process-tracing to examine the decision-making of each of these 11 U.S. NATO allies. Using a multicausal framework, the dissertation compares these decisions across the 11 cases and posits hypotheses concerning common causal inferences. These hypotheses are then cross-checked statistically using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.The dissertation draws two main conclusions. First, based on extensive interviews with senior officials from the Obama and Trump Administrations and NATO political and military leaders, it finds that those U.S. allies that elect to participate in DCA have not been pressured or coerced by the U.S. or NATO to do so. To the contrary, the interviews reveal that DCA is effectively exempted from NATO's normal "fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge" monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, most senior U.S. national security officials cannot, it appears, identify which allies are in DCA and which are not. In effect, then, DCA can best be described as a "coalition of the willing" within NATO. With the notable exception of Germany, which is a special case due to its size, economic power and central geographic position in Europe, participating in this nuclear mission is widely regarded in Washington and in Brussels as voluntary or discretionary.Second, the dissertation contends that rather than being pressured, individual Allies decide whether or not to participate in DCA based on their own sovereign calculation of specific countervailing considerations "pro" and "con." The dissertation identifies five such factors. On the "con" side, they are extra cost and domestic opposition to nuclear weapons. On the "pro" side, they are balance of threat, nature and degree of their transatlantic alignment, and status or ranking within NATO.Of the six U.S. NATO allies assumed in this dissertation to be DCA participants, five (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands) are consistent in placing high value on their status/ranking within NATO (NR), in maintaining a transatlantic alignment in which they "hedge" their dependence on the United States by playing strong roles within the EU, and in viewing the Russian threat in milder degrees, mainly because they are not convinced that its intentions are offensive vis-a-vis NATO allies themselves. In these five nations there is a high degree of domestic opposition to nuclear weapons, but the extra costs are low relative to their mid-range defense budgets. In addition to these considerations, Germany's participation in DCA is also uniquely a function of its position as the "lynchpin" of the European DCA posture, which puts it on the receiving end of strong pressure from the United States.Of the five U.S. NATO allies who are DCA non-participants, four (Canada, Denmark, Norway and Portugal) have all five factors in common. They each:1.Would face high degrees of extra costs to join DCA relative to their generally smaller (in the aggregate) defense budgets;2.Have high degrees of domestic opposition to nuclear weapons;3.Perceive the threat from Russia as only low-to-medium;4.Maintain close bilateral alignments with the United States; and5.Are able to utilize other institutional mechanisms to establish their ranking and status within NATO.For specific reasons identified in the dissertation, Turkey and Spain are outliers in terms of the common factors identified in the two groupings.

ISBN: 9798492761363Subjects--Topical Terms:

2197382
Military studies.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Burden-Sharing

Nato Nuclear Burden-Sharing Post -Crimea: What Constitutes "Free-Riding"?
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Pfaltzgraff, Robert L.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Tufts University), 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation focuses on a sub-set of nations in NATO - the 11 U.S. allies that are both equipped and eligible to assume operational roles under the Alliance's "nuclear-sharing" arrangements, as constituted at present by the Dual Capable Aircraft (DCA) posture. The dissertation seeks to explain why 6 of the 11 have decided to opt-in on this mission, whereas 5 have elected to opt-out. The dissertation examines this question in the context of the late Robert E. Osgood's contention that an alliance is a "latent war community, based on general cooperation that goes beyond formal provisions and that the signatories must continually estimate in order to preserve mutual confidence in each other's fidelity to specified obligations (emphasis added)." The dissertation examines how this "latent war community," the NATO Alliance, defines its members' "specified obligations" to participate, or not, in DCA, and how the Alliance assesses its allies' "fidelity" to these "obligations," in terms of generally-accepted definitions in the literature of "burden-sharing" versus "free-riding."The dissertation employs within-case process-tracing to examine the decision-making of each of these 11 U.S. NATO allies. Using a multicausal framework, the dissertation compares these decisions across the 11 cases and posits hypotheses concerning common causal inferences. These hypotheses are then cross-checked statistically using fuzzy set Qualitative Comparative Analysis.The dissertation draws two main conclusions. First, based on extensive interviews with senior officials from the Obama and Trump Administrations and NATO political and military leaders, it finds that those U.S. allies that elect to participate in DCA have not been pressured or coerced by the U.S. or NATO to do so. To the contrary, the interviews reveal that DCA is effectively exempted from NATO's normal "fair burden-sharing and reasonable challenge" monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Indeed, most senior U.S. national security officials cannot, it appears, identify which allies are in DCA and which are not. In effect, then, DCA can best be described as a "coalition of the willing" within NATO. With the notable exception of Germany, which is a special case due to its size, economic power and central geographic position in Europe, participating in this nuclear mission is widely regarded in Washington and in Brussels as voluntary or discretionary.Second, the dissertation contends that rather than being pressured, individual Allies decide whether or not to participate in DCA based on their own sovereign calculation of specific countervailing considerations "pro" and "con." The dissertation identifies five such factors. On the "con" side, they are extra cost and domestic opposition to nuclear weapons. On the "pro" side, they are balance of threat, nature and degree of their transatlantic alignment, and status or ranking within NATO.Of the six U.S. NATO allies assumed in this dissertation to be DCA participants, five (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands) are consistent in placing high value on their status/ranking within NATO (NR), in maintaining a transatlantic alignment in which they "hedge" their dependence on the United States by playing strong roles within the EU, and in viewing the Russian threat in milder degrees, mainly because they are not convinced that its intentions are offensive vis-a-vis NATO allies themselves. In these five nations there is a high degree of domestic opposition to nuclear weapons, but the extra costs are low relative to their mid-range defense budgets. In addition to these considerations, Germany's participation in DCA is also uniquely a function of its position as the "lynchpin" of the European DCA posture, which puts it on the receiving end of strong pressure from the United States.Of the five U.S. NATO allies who are DCA non-participants, four (Canada, Denmark, Norway and Portugal) have all five factors in common. They each:1.Would face high degrees of extra costs to join DCA relative to their generally smaller (in the aggregate) defense budgets;2.Have high degrees of domestic opposition to nuclear weapons;3.Perceive the threat from Russia as only low-to-medium;4.Maintain close bilateral alignments with the United States; and5.Are able to utilize other institutional mechanisms to establish their ranking and status within NATO.For specific reasons identified in the dissertation, Turkey and Spain are outliers in terms of the common factors identified in the two groupings.
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