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Essays in Information Economics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Information Economics./
作者:	Gu, Jiadong.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2022,
面頁冊數:	181 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-11B.
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=29062873
ISBN:	9798438798545

Essays in Information Economics.
Gu, Jiadong.

Essays in Information Economics. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2022 - 181 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-11, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2022.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The dissertation consists of three essays, focusing on information and data. The booming digital technology and data economy allow wide collection, disclosure, and trade of information in markets. In strategic environments, market participants' behaviors are shaped by the information they acquired from or disclosed by others. My dissertation address the effects and consequences of information in different market environments.Chapter 1 studies optimal mechanisms for collecting and trading data to capture the cross-market effect of data trade. Consumers benefit from revealing information about their taste to a service provider because this improves the service. However, the information is also valuable to a third party as it may extract more revenue from the consumer in another market called the product market. The paper characterizes the constrained optimal mechanism for the service provider subject to incentive feasibility. It is shown that the service provider sometimes sells no information or only partial information in order to preserve profits in the service market. Moreover, a ban on data trade may reduce social welfare because it makes it harder to price discriminate in the product market.Chapter 2, with Peter Norman, considers how information and search frictions drive statistical discrimination. It offers a search-theoretic model of statistical discrimination, in which firms treat identical groups unequally based on their occupational choices. The model admits symmetric equilibria in which the group characteristic is ignored, but also asymmetric equilibria in which a group is statistically discriminated against, even when symmetric equilibria are unique. Moreover, a robust possibility is that symmetric equilibria become unstable when the group characteristic is introduced. Unlike most previous literature, our model can justify affirmative action since it eliminates asymmetric equilibria without distorting incentives.Chapter 3 investigates the regulatory banking information disclosure from the perspective of market liquidity. It studies stress tests as Bayesian persuasion within the fundamental bank run framework. It shows that the optimal disclosure policy depends on the liquidation cost of the long-term asset. In particular, when the liquidation cost is low, the optimal stress test fully discloses information about banks: it increases the likelihood of enjoying the high asset return. When the liquidation cost is high, the optimal stress test partially discloses information: it reduces the likelihood of costly bank runs. The central trade-off in stress test design is between the bank run cost and the high asset return. The theory suggests regulatory policy coordination and offers insights on different stress testing experiences across countries.

ISBN: 9798438798545Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Information economics

Essays in Information Economics.
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506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a The dissertation consists of three essays, focusing on information and data. The booming digital technology and data economy allow wide collection, disclosure, and trade of information in markets. In strategic environments, market participants' behaviors are shaped by the information they acquired from or disclosed by others. My dissertation address the effects and consequences of information in different market environments.Chapter 1 studies optimal mechanisms for collecting and trading data to capture the cross-market effect of data trade. Consumers benefit from revealing information about their taste to a service provider because this improves the service. However, the information is also valuable to a third party as it may extract more revenue from the consumer in another market called the product market. The paper characterizes the constrained optimal mechanism for the service provider subject to incentive feasibility. It is shown that the service provider sometimes sells no information or only partial information in order to preserve profits in the service market. Moreover, a ban on data trade may reduce social welfare because it makes it harder to price discriminate in the product market.Chapter 2, with Peter Norman, considers how information and search frictions drive statistical discrimination. It offers a search-theoretic model of statistical discrimination, in which firms treat identical groups unequally based on their occupational choices. The model admits symmetric equilibria in which the group characteristic is ignored, but also asymmetric equilibria in which a group is statistically discriminated against, even when symmetric equilibria are unique. Moreover, a robust possibility is that symmetric equilibria become unstable when the group characteristic is introduced. Unlike most previous literature, our model can justify affirmative action since it eliminates asymmetric equilibria without distorting incentives.Chapter 3 investigates the regulatory banking information disclosure from the perspective of market liquidity. It studies stress tests as Bayesian persuasion within the fundamental bank run framework. It shows that the optimal disclosure policy depends on the liquidation cost of the long-term asset. In particular, when the liquidation cost is low, the optimal stress test fully discloses information about banks: it increases the likelihood of enjoying the high asset return. When the liquidation cost is high, the optimal stress test partially discloses information: it reduces the likelihood of costly bank runs. The central trade-off in stress test design is between the bank run cost and the high asset return. The theory suggests regulatory policy coordination and offers insights on different stress testing experiences across countries.
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