東華大學圖書館 |

Essays on Inattention and Inequality.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Inattention and Inequality./
作者:	Bloedel, Alexander Wyatt.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	427 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-05A.
標題:	Verbal communication. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28688337
ISBN:	9798544203759

Essays on Inattention and Inequality.
Bloedel, Alexander Wyatt.

Essays on Inattention and Inequality. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 427 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation consists of four papers in economic theory which study the optimal acquisition, transmission, and elicitation of information. The first two chapters consider models of rational inattention, in which agents flexibly and optimally acquire costly information before taking decisions under uncertainty. The latter two chapters consider models of dynamic mechanism design with persistent private information, with a particular focus on the long-run inequality generated by optimal mechanisms.Chapter 1 (The Cost of Optimally Acquired Information; co-authored with Weijie Zhong) provides optimization foundations for "reduced form" information cost functions, of the sort used in the rational inattention literature. The paper develops a theory for the expected cost of optimally acquired information when information can be acquired sequentially. We study the "reduced-form" Indirect Costfunctions for information generated by sequential minimization of a "primitive" Direct Cost function. The class of Indirect Costs is characterized by a recursive condition called Sequential Learning-Proofness. This condition is inconsistent with Prior-Invariance: Indirect Costs must depend on the decision-maker's prior beliefs.We show that Sequential Learning-Proofness provides partial optimality foundations for the Uniformly Posterior Separable (UPS) cost functions used in the rational inattention literature: a cost function is UPS if and only if it is an Indirect Cost that (i) satisfies a mild regularity condition or, equivalently, (ii) is generated (only) by Direct Costs for which the optimal sequential strategy involves observing only Gaussian diffusion signals. We characterize the unique UPS cost function that is generated by a Prior-Invariant Direct Cost; it exists only when there are exactly two states.We also propose two specific UPS cost functions based on additional optimality principles. We introduce and characterize Total Information as the unique Indirect Cost that is Process-Invariant when information can be decomposed both sequentially and "simultaneously": it is uniquely invariant to the "merging" and "splitting" of experiments. Under regularity conditions, Mutual Information is the unique Indirect Cost that is Compression-Invariant when aspects of the state space can be "freely ignored": it is uniquely invariant to the to the "merging" and "splitting" of states. We argue that Total Information and Mutual Information represent the normatively ideal costs of, respectively, "producing" and "processing" information.Chapter 2 (Persuading a Rationally Inattentive Agent; co-authored with Ilya Segal) studies a combined problem of information design and rational inattention. How should information be disclosed to an inattentive audience? We develop a model in which a Sender transmits signals about an uncertain state to a rationally inattentive Receiver, who privately bears a mutual information cost (Sims (2003)) to process these signals before taking an action. Information disclosure serves dual purposes: to persuade Receiver when preferences over actions are misaligned, and to manipulate Receiver's attention, which is subject to moral hazard. The latter friction causes the standard Obedience Principle to fail: Sender cannot simply provide an action recommendation because Receiver would sometimes ignore it. We characterize optimal disclosure in a canonical binary-action setting using a first-order approach.

ISBN: 9798544203759Subjects--Topical Terms:

3560678
Verbal communication.

Essays on Inattention and Inequality.
LDR:04469nmm a2200313 4500 001 2347510
005 20220801062221.5
008 241004s2021 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798544203759
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28688337
035 $a (MiAaPQ)STANFORDhb050cx8986
035 $a AAI28688337
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Bloedel, Alexander Wyatt. $3 3686773
245 1 0 $a Essays on Inattention and Inequality.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 427 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-05, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Milgrom, Paul;Segal, Ilya;Bernheim, Douglas.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation consists of four papers in economic theory which study the optimal acquisition, transmission, and elicitation of information. The first two chapters consider models of rational inattention, in which agents flexibly and optimally acquire costly information before taking decisions under uncertainty. The latter two chapters consider models of dynamic mechanism design with persistent private information, with a particular focus on the long-run inequality generated by optimal mechanisms.Chapter 1 (The Cost of Optimally Acquired Information; co-authored with Weijie Zhong) provides optimization foundations for "reduced form" information cost functions, of the sort used in the rational inattention literature. The paper develops a theory for the expected cost of optimally acquired information when information can be acquired sequentially. We study the "reduced-form" Indirect Costfunctions for information generated by sequential minimization of a "primitive" Direct Cost function. The class of Indirect Costs is characterized by a recursive condition called Sequential Learning-Proofness. This condition is inconsistent with Prior-Invariance: Indirect Costs must depend on the decision-maker's prior beliefs.We show that Sequential Learning-Proofness provides partial optimality foundations for the Uniformly Posterior Separable (UPS) cost functions used in the rational inattention literature: a cost function is UPS if and only if it is an Indirect Cost that (i) satisfies a mild regularity condition or, equivalently, (ii) is generated (only) by Direct Costs for which the optimal sequential strategy involves observing only Gaussian diffusion signals. We characterize the unique UPS cost function that is generated by a Prior-Invariant Direct Cost; it exists only when there are exactly two states.We also propose two specific UPS cost functions based on additional optimality principles. We introduce and characterize Total Information as the unique Indirect Cost that is Process-Invariant when information can be decomposed both sequentially and "simultaneously": it is uniquely invariant to the "merging" and "splitting" of experiments. Under regularity conditions, Mutual Information is the unique Indirect Cost that is Compression-Invariant when aspects of the state space can be "freely ignored": it is uniquely invariant to the to the "merging" and "splitting" of states. We argue that Total Information and Mutual Information represent the normatively ideal costs of, respectively, "producing" and "processing" information.Chapter 2 (Persuading a Rationally Inattentive Agent; co-authored with Ilya Segal) studies a combined problem of information design and rational inattention. How should information be disclosed to an inattentive audience? We develop a model in which a Sender transmits signals about an uncertain state to a rationally inattentive Receiver, who privately bears a mutual information cost (Sims (2003)) to process these signals before taking an action. Information disclosure serves dual purposes: to persuade Receiver when preferences over actions are misaligned, and to manipulate Receiver's attention, which is subject to moral hazard. The latter friction causes the standard Obedience Principle to fail: Sender cannot simply provide an action recommendation because Receiver would sometimes ignore it. We characterize optimal disclosure in a canonical binary-action setting using a first-order approach.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Verbal communication. $3 3560678
650 4 $a Communication. $3 524709
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0459
710 2 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-05A.
790 $a 0212
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28688337