東華大學圖書館 |

The Practical Point of View and Constructivism From Transcendental Idealism to Metanormative Constructivism.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Practical Point of View and Constructivism From Transcendental Idealism to Metanormative Constructivism./
Author:	Kim, Richard.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
Description:	170 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-06, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-06A.
Subject:	Morality. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28827895
ISBN:	9798494461773

The Practical Point of View and Constructivism From Transcendental Idealism to Metanormative Constructivism.
Kim, Richard.

The Practical Point of View and Constructivism From Transcendental Idealism to Metanormative Constructivism. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 170 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-06, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

My project examines a set of views that might be seen as contemporary descendants of a tradition inspired by Kant's transcendental idealism-they fall under the label "constructivism". I examine a constructivism about freedom and responsibility, and a constructivism about normative entities, such as values, reasons and normative facts in practical and moral discourse. I examine three constructivist views: compatibilist constructivism defended by Hilary Bok, and constitutivist versions of constructivism given by Christine Korsgaard and by Sharon Street. Bok's and Korsgaard's views are designed to show that we are genuinely free and responsible for what we do. And they attempt to vindicate, what Kant calls, "practical freedom". Korsgaard's and Street's views concern the constitution of human agency and accounts of the nature of normative entities and truths. They attempt to explain normative truths by appeal to principles constitutive of rational and valuing activities. My project engages with two fundamental issues in practical and moral philosophy. The first is the problem of freedom of the will, why our freedom and responsibility must be established at all, and how is this done by way of a vindication of "practical freedom". Another fundamental issue I will investigate is whether "constitutivist" versions of constructivism count as a distinctive general position in practical or moral philosophy about the nature of the normative. That is, is metanormative constructivism intelligible and a distinctive and indeed novel position in metaethics or meta-normative studies. What ties them altogether, at least superficially, is that each of them appeal to what they call "the practical standpoint" or "the practical point of view." Which they contrast with what they call "the theoretical standpoint" or "the theoretical point of view". The practical standpoint or point of view is the supposed first-personal point of view from which we engage in practical deliberation, make judgments about what we have reason to do, and from within which we engage with the world through rational action or valuing behavior; it is the point of view from which we act or value anything at all. The theoretical standpoint or point of view is the supposed, disengaged third-personal point of view of the scientist attempting to create an adequately descriptive or explanatory account of the world, where scientific or "theoretical" facts are established. They appeal to points of view to argue that reasons or normative facts are not merely salient from, or indicated within, a practical perspective but are in generated from within it, somehow constituted within a practical point of view. An appeal to a practical point of view reveals no mere instrumental value but rather a source of certain values: values that are generated from within the standpoint and do not exist independent of it. Normative facts and truths about what we have reason to do or to value are in some sense constituted by or within the practical point of view and purportedly do not exist independently of the point of view. The thought is that an appeal to standpoints is a commitment to the existence of perspectivedependent truths, such that all normative truths established by the practical standpoint are in some way incommensurable with truths established from the theoretical points of view of our natural sciences. So, what might be explicitly denied from the point of view our natural science (~P) might be explicitly affirmed from the point of view of the acting agent (P), yet without there being a conflict or inconsistency between the standpoints. In effect argue that there are no conflicts to resolve at all; the ostensible conflicts are merely apparent. Korsgaard and Street offer an account of normative facts as "thoroughly constructivist" insofar as such facts are constituted in relation to, or "all the way down to", "essentially normative activities". Normative facts are "mind-dependent truths" distinct in kind from the truths established in theoretical points of view (e.g. scientific facts). So instead of different (sets of) truths, they argue that the practical point of view establishes a different kind of truth. I argue that constitutivist versions of constructivism can indeed be established as a novel and distinctive form of antirealism in metaethics or metanormative studies. I do so by returning to Kant's works, rejecting judgment-dependence as the primary way to understand Kant's own antirealism, and introducing what I take to be a new antirealist taxonomical category: a non-errortheoretic, non-expressivist, non-idealist, and non-subjectivist style of non-realism opposing robust realism in practical philosophy by denying a rational will independence of normative truths, contra heteronomy, in favor of a non-instrumental account of the significance of the existence and value of the rational will, where truth-conditions are given by the principles and norm constitutive of the exercise of our practical rational powers.

ISBN: 9798494461773Subjects--Topical Terms:

3561985
Morality.

The Practical Point of View and Constructivism From Transcendental Idealism to Metanormative Constructivism.
LDR:06102nmm a2200301 4500 001 2346915
005 20220706051322.5
008 241004s2021 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798494461773
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28827895
035 $a (MiAaPQ)STANFORDsp360wc2069
035 $a AAI28827895
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Kim, Richard. $3 3686121
245 1 0 $a The Practical Point of View and Constructivism From Transcendental Idealism to Metanormative Constructivism.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 170 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-06, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Hills, David; Dannenberg, Jorah; Wood, Allen W.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a My project examines a set of views that might be seen as contemporary descendants of a tradition inspired by Kant's transcendental idealism-they fall under the label "constructivism". I examine a constructivism about freedom and responsibility, and a constructivism about normative entities, such as values, reasons and normative facts in practical and moral discourse. I examine three constructivist views: compatibilist constructivism defended by Hilary Bok, and constitutivist versions of constructivism given by Christine Korsgaard and by Sharon Street. Bok's and Korsgaard's views are designed to show that we are genuinely free and responsible for what we do. And they attempt to vindicate, what Kant calls, "practical freedom". Korsgaard's and Street's views concern the constitution of human agency and accounts of the nature of normative entities and truths. They attempt to explain normative truths by appeal to principles constitutive of rational and valuing activities. My project engages with two fundamental issues in practical and moral philosophy. The first is the problem of freedom of the will, why our freedom and responsibility must be established at all, and how is this done by way of a vindication of "practical freedom". Another fundamental issue I will investigate is whether "constitutivist" versions of constructivism count as a distinctive general position in practical or moral philosophy about the nature of the normative. That is, is metanormative constructivism intelligible and a distinctive and indeed novel position in metaethics or meta-normative studies. What ties them altogether, at least superficially, is that each of them appeal to what they call "the practical standpoint" or "the practical point of view." Which they contrast with what they call "the theoretical standpoint" or "the theoretical point of view". The practical standpoint or point of view is the supposed first-personal point of view from which we engage in practical deliberation, make judgments about what we have reason to do, and from within which we engage with the world through rational action or valuing behavior; it is the point of view from which we act or value anything at all. The theoretical standpoint or point of view is the supposed, disengaged third-personal point of view of the scientist attempting to create an adequately descriptive or explanatory account of the world, where scientific or "theoretical" facts are established. They appeal to points of view to argue that reasons or normative facts are not merely salient from, or indicated within, a practical perspective but are in generated from within it, somehow constituted within a practical point of view. An appeal to a practical point of view reveals no mere instrumental value but rather a source of certain values: values that are generated from within the standpoint and do not exist independent of it. Normative facts and truths about what we have reason to do or to value are in some sense constituted by or within the practical point of view and purportedly do not exist independently of the point of view. The thought is that an appeal to standpoints is a commitment to the existence of perspectivedependent truths, such that all normative truths established by the practical standpoint are in some way incommensurable with truths established from the theoretical points of view of our natural sciences. So, what might be explicitly denied from the point of view our natural science (~P) might be explicitly affirmed from the point of view of the acting agent (P), yet without there being a conflict or inconsistency between the standpoints. In effect argue that there are no conflicts to resolve at all; the ostensible conflicts are merely apparent. Korsgaard and Street offer an account of normative facts as "thoroughly constructivist" insofar as such facts are constituted in relation to, or "all the way down to", "essentially normative activities". Normative facts are "mind-dependent truths" distinct in kind from the truths established in theoretical points of view (e.g. scientific facts). So instead of different (sets of) truths, they argue that the practical point of view establishes a different kind of truth. I argue that constitutivist versions of constructivism can indeed be established as a novel and distinctive form of antirealism in metaethics or metanormative studies. I do so by returning to Kant's works, rejecting judgment-dependence as the primary way to understand Kant's own antirealism, and introducing what I take to be a new antirealist taxonomical category: a non-errortheoretic, non-expressivist, non-idealist, and non-subjectivist style of non-realism opposing robust realism in practical philosophy by denying a rational will independence of normative truths, contra heteronomy, in favor of a non-instrumental account of the significance of the existence and value of the rational will, where truth-conditions are given by the principles and norm constitutive of the exercise of our practical rational powers.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Morality. $3 3561985
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Libertarianism. $3 525052
650 4 $a Philosophers. $3 558041
690 $a 0422
710 2 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-06A.
790 $a 0212
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28827895