東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Public Cyberinstitutions: Signaling State Cybercapacity.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Public Cyberinstitutions: Signaling State Cybercapacity./
作者:	Kostyuk, Nadiya.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	237 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-07, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-07B.
標題:	Computer science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28240152
ISBN:	9798684622441

Public Cyberinstitutions: Signaling State Cybercapacity.
Kostyuk, Nadiya.

Public Cyberinstitutions: Signaling State Cybercapacity. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 237 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-07, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Even though there has been a rapid increase in state cybercapacity over the last two decades, researchers have paid little attention to this phenomenon. In my dissertation Public Cyberinstitutions: Signaling State Cybercapacity, I employ a combination of formal theory, event history analysis, and interviews to shed light on what drives a state's decision to develop this capacity in the form of public cyberinstitutions (PCIs)-publicly observable efforts meant to signal the state offensive and defensive cybercapacity-and the effects these PCIs have on its adversaries' decision-making. Unlike existing scholarship which emphasizes the cyberthreat environment as the main driver of PCIs, I empirically model the international proliferation of PCIs as a diffusion process and argue that it happens through different types of networks. The distinct pathways behind different types of PCIs reflect the different types of signals each is intended to send.National cybersecurity strategies diffuse through networks of "like-minded" states, with similar preferences on cybersovereignty. The development of a military cyberapparatus diffuses through military alliance networks, following the logic of complementarity. National strategies are among the less costly PCIs a country could adopt, but-because their purpose is to articulate a country's main goals, threats and priorities in the cyber domain-governments cannot adopt them without first considering the role the Internet plays within their polity and how heavily they wish to regulate it. Military cybersecurity units, meanwhile, have higher startup and maintenance costs, and the willingness to pay these costs sends a potentially informative signal to a country's allies and adversaries. Rather than "free ride" off the cybercapabilities of one's allies, however, countries tend to complement the activities of their allies (e.g., invest more if their allies invest less). I test these theoretical explanations with newly collected data sets on national cybersecurity strategies and on state cybersecurity organizations between 1999 and 2018, and find robust empirical support.Using an incomplete-information model I also demonstrate that PCIs meant to demonstrate an increase in cybercapacity only deter adversaries that are susceptible to the costs created by this increased cybercapacity. Despite this, states tend to over-invest in PCIs. In particular, weak cyber states tend to over-invest to convince adversaries that they are strong, whereas strong cyber states over-invest so that adversaries do not believe that they are weak states pretending to be strong. In doing so, these states reduce their overall cybercapacity. Through my interviews with cybersecurity experts, intelligence reports, and examples of attempted election interference campaigns, I establish the empirical plausibility of this theoretical result. These findings, which focus on a fundamentally new domain of warfare and statecraft, have important implications for national security policy.

ISBN: 9798684622441Subjects--Topical Terms:

523869
Computer science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Cybercapacity

Public Cyberinstitutions: Signaling State Cybercapacity.
LDR:04493nmm a2200469 4500 001 2343981
005 20220513115340.5
008 241004s2020 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798684622441
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28240152
035 $a (MiAaPQ)umichrackham003291
035 $a AAI28240152
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Kostyuk, Nadiya. $3 3682660
245 1 0 $a Public Cyberinstitutions: Signaling State Cybercapacity.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2020
300 $a 237 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-07, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: Morrow, James D.;Zhukov, Yuri.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Michigan, 2020.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a Even though there has been a rapid increase in state cybercapacity over the last two decades, researchers have paid little attention to this phenomenon. In my dissertation Public Cyberinstitutions: Signaling State Cybercapacity, I employ a combination of formal theory, event history analysis, and interviews to shed light on what drives a state's decision to develop this capacity in the form of public cyberinstitutions (PCIs)-publicly observable efforts meant to signal the state offensive and defensive cybercapacity-and the effects these PCIs have on its adversaries' decision-making. Unlike existing scholarship which emphasizes the cyberthreat environment as the main driver of PCIs, I empirically model the international proliferation of PCIs as a diffusion process and argue that it happens through different types of networks. The distinct pathways behind different types of PCIs reflect the different types of signals each is intended to send.National cybersecurity strategies diffuse through networks of "like-minded" states, with similar preferences on cybersovereignty. The development of a military cyberapparatus diffuses through military alliance networks, following the logic of complementarity. National strategies are among the less costly PCIs a country could adopt, but-because their purpose is to articulate a country's main goals, threats and priorities in the cyber domain-governments cannot adopt them without first considering the role the Internet plays within their polity and how heavily they wish to regulate it. Military cybersecurity units, meanwhile, have higher startup and maintenance costs, and the willingness to pay these costs sends a potentially informative signal to a country's allies and adversaries. Rather than "free ride" off the cybercapabilities of one's allies, however, countries tend to complement the activities of their allies (e.g., invest more if their allies invest less). I test these theoretical explanations with newly collected data sets on national cybersecurity strategies and on state cybersecurity organizations between 1999 and 2018, and find robust empirical support.Using an incomplete-information model I also demonstrate that PCIs meant to demonstrate an increase in cybercapacity only deter adversaries that are susceptible to the costs created by this increased cybercapacity. Despite this, states tend to over-invest in PCIs. In particular, weak cyber states tend to over-invest to convince adversaries that they are strong, whereas strong cyber states over-invest so that adversaries do not believe that they are weak states pretending to be strong. In doing so, these states reduce their overall cybercapacity. Through my interviews with cybersecurity experts, intelligence reports, and examples of attempted election interference campaigns, I establish the empirical plausibility of this theoretical result. These findings, which focus on a fundamentally new domain of warfare and statecraft, have important implications for national security policy.
590 $a School code: 0127.
650 4 $a Computer science. $3 523869
650 4 $a Military studies. $3 2197382
650 4 $a Operations research. $3 547123
650 4 $a Web studies. $3 2122754
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
650 4 $a Public policy. $3 532803
653 $a Cybercapacity
653 $a Cyberinstitution
653 $a Policy diffusion
653 $a Cyber deterrence
653 $a Military cybersecurity organizations
653 $a Military alliance networks
653 $a National security policy
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0796
690 $a 0984
690 $a 0750
690 $a 0630
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0646
710 2 $a University of Michigan. $b Public Policy & Political Science. $3 3555883
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 82-07B.
790 $a 0127
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2020
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28240152