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Essays in Review Systems and Industrial Organization.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Review Systems and Industrial Organization./
作者:	Sorokin, Dmitry.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	197 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02A.
標題:	Computer & video games. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28323758
ISBN:	9798534690477

Essays in Review Systems and Industrial Organization.
Sorokin, Dmitry.

Essays in Review Systems and Industrial Organization. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 197 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In Part I of this dissertation I study executive compensation contracts that reward managers based on revenue in addition to profit. I find that the cost of incentive provision is higher under revenue-oriented contracts. Such contracts could be a profit-enhancing tool for shareholders in oligopolistic markets, a phenomenon known as strategic delegation. I analyze the interplay between strategic delegation and incentive provision. Results depend non-trivially on the model of competition and whether the manager cuts costs or increases demand. In Part II I study how review systems affect the behavior of customers and firms in a large marketplace called Steam. Chapter 2 compares two approaches to estimating the effect of reviews on sales: a panel regression and a regression discontinuity design. I find that having better reviews increases sales by 3-7%. I uncover an identification issue with the regression discontinuity design based on the review score of a product and propose an alternative design. In Chapter 3 I document that firms in online marketplaces use price promotions to facilitate transitions to better review tiers (similar to the number of stars on Amazon.com). I find that firms close to upgrading their tier are 4-9% more likely to discount. Two effects are at play. First, a selection effect arises because customers who buy during a discount could be different from the regular ones. Second, a variance effect reflects the idea that positive reviews could help the firm move up a review tier, while negative reviews would keep the tier unchanged. I estimate a tractable structural model of demand and reviewing behavior, and find evidence of the importance of the variance effect.

ISBN: 9798534690477Subjects--Topical Terms:

3548317
Computer & video games.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Managerial compensation

Essays in Review Systems and Industrial Organization.
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100 1 $a Sorokin, Dmitry. $3 3682475
245 1 0 $a Essays in Review Systems and Industrial Organization.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 197 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Christensen, Timothy.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a In Part I of this dissertation I study executive compensation contracts that reward managers based on revenue in addition to profit. I find that the cost of incentive provision is higher under revenue-oriented contracts. Such contracts could be a profit-enhancing tool for shareholders in oligopolistic markets, a phenomenon known as strategic delegation. I analyze the interplay between strategic delegation and incentive provision. Results depend non-trivially on the model of competition and whether the manager cuts costs or increases demand. In Part II I study how review systems affect the behavior of customers and firms in a large marketplace called Steam. Chapter 2 compares two approaches to estimating the effect of reviews on sales: a panel regression and a regression discontinuity design. I find that having better reviews increases sales by 3-7%. I uncover an identification issue with the regression discontinuity design based on the review score of a product and propose an alternative design. In Chapter 3 I document that firms in online marketplaces use price promotions to facilitate transitions to better review tiers (similar to the number of stars on Amazon.com). I find that firms close to upgrading their tier are 4-9% more likely to discount. Two effects are at play. First, a selection effect arises because customers who buy during a discount could be different from the regular ones. Second, a variance effect reflects the idea that positive reviews could help the firm move up a review tier, while negative reviews would keep the tier unchanged. I estimate a tractable structural model of demand and reviewing behavior, and find evidence of the importance of the variance effect.
590 $a School code: 0146.
650 4 $a Computer & video games. $3 3548317
650 4 $a Random variables. $3 646291
650 4 $a Managers. $2 gtt $3 1457937
650 4 $a Age. $3 1486010
650 4 $a Values. $3 518648
650 4 $a Equilibrium. $3 668417
650 4 $a Liability. $3 3562832
650 4 $a Expected values. $3 3563993
650 4 $a Competition. $3 537031
653 $a Managerial compensation
653 $a Online reviews
653 $a Price promotions
653 $a Principal-agent problem
653 $a Two-sided markets
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0338
690 $a 0454
710 2 $a New York University. $b Economics. $3 1032403
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-02A.
790 $a 0146
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28323758