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After the Negotiations: Understanding Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	After the Negotiations: Understanding Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control./
Author:	Herzog, Stephen.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
Description:	366 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28320753
ISBN:	9798522998820

After the Negotiations: Understanding Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control.
Herzog, Stephen.

After the Negotiations: Understanding Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 366 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Why do advanced nuclear states agree to legally forswear nuclear weapons? Many international relations studies have explored why states seek to develop nuclear weapons. Yet, the literature does not address why states would participate in multilateral nuclear arms control treaties that tie their hands against doing so. This gap in the existing scholarship matters because nuclear weapons are one of few tools that can effectively guarantee a state's sovereignty and national survival.My dissertation disaggregates the process of entering multilateral nuclear arms control treaties into two phases. Previous studies have discussed either treaty signature or ratification, overlooking the often lengthy delays between them. However, motivations for signing and ratifying are often distinct because these actions carry different legal weights and political consequences. I discover that signing a treaty can reflect a variety of "type signaling" motivations about a state's views on the distribution of power the agreement reifies. Indeed, signatories signal to the international community their advocacy for the treaty or subordinate status to a powerful patron that compels them to sign. Non-signatories signal a desire for enhanced status or interest in considering the nuclear option. But ultimately, states will only engage in legal "commitment signaling" not to pursue nuclear weapons through ratification if their security environment permits it. Accession to a treaty once it has already entered into force-and signature is no longer possible-requires a "joint signal" pertaining to both necessary conditions.To demonstrate the applicability of my theory, I investigate four case studies of states with advanced civilian nuclear energy capabilities or weapons proliferation aspirations. I examine the causal pathways that led Brazil, Egypt, Japan, and Romania to embrace the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. These states acted in accordance with the two-step process of type and commitment signaling described in my theory despite varying regime types, alliance commitments, levels of industrialization, and more. The case studies shed new light on international nuclear politics by drawing on diverse sources, including archival documents and original elite interviews I conducted with decision-makers. Taken together, this dissertation makes three primary contributions to the scholarly and policy-making domains. First, it offers a new process-based theory explaining an understudied phenomenon in international security. Second, it provides evidence and insights that challenge dominant narratives surrounding historical cases of legal nuclear forbearance. Third, it suggests novel approaches to understanding incentive structures behind differing levels of commitment to multilateral nuclear arms control.

ISBN: 9798522998820Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Arms control

After the Negotiations: Understanding Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control.
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245 1 0 $a After the Negotiations: Understanding Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control.
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300 $a 366 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Monteiro, Nuno P.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a Why do advanced nuclear states agree to legally forswear nuclear weapons? Many international relations studies have explored why states seek to develop nuclear weapons. Yet, the literature does not address why states would participate in multilateral nuclear arms control treaties that tie their hands against doing so. This gap in the existing scholarship matters because nuclear weapons are one of few tools that can effectively guarantee a state's sovereignty and national survival.My dissertation disaggregates the process of entering multilateral nuclear arms control treaties into two phases. Previous studies have discussed either treaty signature or ratification, overlooking the often lengthy delays between them. However, motivations for signing and ratifying are often distinct because these actions carry different legal weights and political consequences. I discover that signing a treaty can reflect a variety of "type signaling" motivations about a state's views on the distribution of power the agreement reifies. Indeed, signatories signal to the international community their advocacy for the treaty or subordinate status to a powerful patron that compels them to sign. Non-signatories signal a desire for enhanced status or interest in considering the nuclear option. But ultimately, states will only engage in legal "commitment signaling" not to pursue nuclear weapons through ratification if their security environment permits it. Accession to a treaty once it has already entered into force-and signature is no longer possible-requires a "joint signal" pertaining to both necessary conditions.To demonstrate the applicability of my theory, I investigate four case studies of states with advanced civilian nuclear energy capabilities or weapons proliferation aspirations. I examine the causal pathways that led Brazil, Egypt, Japan, and Romania to embrace the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. These states acted in accordance with the two-step process of type and commitment signaling described in my theory despite varying regime types, alliance commitments, levels of industrialization, and more. The case studies shed new light on international nuclear politics by drawing on diverse sources, including archival documents and original elite interviews I conducted with decision-makers. Taken together, this dissertation makes three primary contributions to the scholarly and policy-making domains. First, it offers a new process-based theory explaining an understudied phenomenon in international security. Second, it provides evidence and insights that challenge dominant narratives surrounding historical cases of legal nuclear forbearance. Third, it suggests novel approaches to understanding incentive structures behind differing levels of commitment to multilateral nuclear arms control.
590 $a School code: 0265.
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650 4 $a International law. $3 560784
650 4 $a Public administration. $3 531287
650 4 $a Military studies. $3 2197382
650 4 $a Public policy. $3 532803
650 4 $a Treaties. $3 677024
650 4 $a Nuclear tests. $3 3680427
650 4 $a Arms control & disarmament. $3 3680428
650 4 $a Uranium. $3 832831
650 4 $a Decision making. $3 517204
650 4 $a Archives & records. $3 3558980
653 $a Arms control
653 $a Diplomacy
653 $a International security
653 $a International treaties
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773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-02A.
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856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28320753