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Mobilization constraints and militar...

Cusumano, Eugenio.

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Mobilization constraints and military privatization = the political cost-effectiveness of outsourcing security /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Mobilization constraints and military privatization/ by Eugenio Cusumano.
Reminder of title:	the political cost-effectiveness of outsourcing security /
Author:	Cusumano, Eugenio.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2023.,
Description:	xix, 240 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ;24 cm.
[NT 15003449]:	1. Introduction -- 2. Military Privatization and State Power in Historical Perspective -- 3. Domestic Political Constraints and Contractor Support to Military Operations: a new Theoretical Framework -- 4. Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in the United States -- 5. Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in the United Kingdom -- 6. Military Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in Italy -- 7. Effectiveness, Norms, and Military Cultures: Assessing Mobilization Constraints against Competing Explanations -- 8. Conclusions.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
Subject:	Private military companies - Political aspects - United States. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16423-1
ISBN:	9783031164231

Mobilization constraints and military privatization = the political cost-effectiveness of outsourcing security /
Cusumano, Eugenio.

Mobilization constraints and military privatizationthe political cost-effectiveness of outsourcing security /[electronic resource] :by Eugenio Cusumano. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2023. - xix, 240 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ;24 cm.

1. Introduction -- 2. Military Privatization and State Power in Historical Perspective -- 3. Domestic Political Constraints and Contractor Support to Military Operations: a new Theoretical Framework -- 4. Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in the United States -- 5. Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in the United Kingdom -- 6. Military Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in Italy -- 7. Effectiveness, Norms, and Military Cultures: Assessing Mobilization Constraints against Competing Explanations -- 8. Conclusions.

This book investigates the connection between tightening mobilization constraints and the use of PMSCs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Drawing on neoclassical realism and institutionalist theory, it conceptualizes democracies' use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as an attempt to circumvent the tightening constraints on the mobilization of military power. The use of private military contractors is less subjected to parliamentary restrictions and less visible to public opinion than the deployment of soldiers. Rather than cheaper in financial terms, PMSCs are therefore politically cost-effective, as they enable decision-makers to minimize the institutional obstacles on conducting military operations and the electoral costs attached thereto. The need to reduce the ex ante hurdles and the ex post costs of military deployments fills the blind spots of alternative explanations for the use of PMSCs based on effectiveness, ideology, and organizational interests. Eugenio Cusumano is Associate Professor of political science at the University of Messina, Italy.

ISBN: 9783031164231

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-031-16423-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

3627298
Private military companies
--Political aspects--United States.

LC Class. No.: UB149

Dewey Class. No.: 355.35

Mobilization constraints and military privatization = the political cost-effectiveness of outsourcing security /
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505 0 $a 1. Introduction -- 2. Military Privatization and State Power in Historical Perspective -- 3. Domestic Political Constraints and Contractor Support to Military Operations: a new Theoretical Framework -- 4. Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in the United States -- 5. Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in the United Kingdom -- 6. Military Mobilization Constraints and Military Privatization in Italy -- 7. Effectiveness, Norms, and Military Cultures: Assessing Mobilization Constraints against Competing Explanations -- 8. Conclusions.
520 $a This book investigates the connection between tightening mobilization constraints and the use of PMSCs in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy. Drawing on neoclassical realism and institutionalist theory, it conceptualizes democracies' use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) as an attempt to circumvent the tightening constraints on the mobilization of military power. The use of private military contractors is less subjected to parliamentary restrictions and less visible to public opinion than the deployment of soldiers. Rather than cheaper in financial terms, PMSCs are therefore politically cost-effective, as they enable decision-makers to minimize the institutional obstacles on conducting military operations and the electoral costs attached thereto. The need to reduce the ex ante hurdles and the ex post costs of military deployments fills the blind spots of alternative explanations for the use of PMSCs based on effectiveness, ideology, and organizational interests. Eugenio Cusumano is Associate Professor of political science at the University of Messina, Italy.
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