東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Biological naturalism and the mind-b...

Anderson, Jane.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Biological naturalism and the mind-body problem

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Biological naturalism and the mind-body problem/ by Jane Anderson.
作者:	Anderson, Jane.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2022.,
面頁冊數:	xii, 295 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. The Explanatory Gap -- Chapter 3. The Hard and The Easy Problems Of Consciousness -- Chapter 4. (Un)consciousness and (Ir)rationality In Psychology -- Chapter 5. The Brain and The Mind-Body-Self -- Chapter 6. 21st Century Biological Naturalism: The Body-Map-Based View and the Affect-Centric View.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Mind and body. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99684-0
ISBN:	9783030996840

Biological naturalism and the mind-body problem
Anderson, Jane.

Biological naturalism and the mind-body problem[electronic resource] /by Jane Anderson. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2022. - xii, 295 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. The Explanatory Gap -- Chapter 3. The Hard and The Easy Problems Of Consciousness -- Chapter 4. (Un)consciousness and (Ir)rationality In Psychology -- Chapter 5. The Brain and The Mind-Body-Self -- Chapter 6. 21st Century Biological Naturalism: The Body-Map-Based View and the Affect-Centric View.

This book offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand "the mind-body problem". The crux of this problem is phenomenal experience, which Thomas Nagel famously described as "what it is like" to be a certain living creature. David Chalmers refers to the problem of "what-it-is-like" as "the hard problem" of consciousness and claims that this problem is so "hard" that investigators have either just ignored the issue completely, investigated a similar (but distinct) problem, or claimed that there is literally nothing to investigate - that phenomenal experience is illusory. This book contends that phenomenal experience is both very real and very important. Two specific "biological naturalist" views are considered in depth. One of these two views, in particular, seems to be free from problems; adopting something along the lines of this view might finally allow us to make sense of the mind-body problem. An essential read for anyone who believes that no satisfactory solution to "the mind-body problem" has yet been discovered.

ISBN: 9783030996840

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-99684-0doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

516332
Mind and body.

LC Class. No.: B105.M53

Dewey Class. No.: 128.2

Biological naturalism and the mind-body problem
LDR:02394nmm a2200337 a 4500 001 2302263
003 DE-He213
005 20220623100616.0
006 m d
007 cr nn 008maaau
008 230409s2022 sz s 0 eng d
020 $a 9783030996840 $q (electronic bk.)
020 $a 9783030996833 $q (paper)
024 7 $a 10.1007/978-3-030-99684-0 $2 doi
035 $a 978-3-030-99684-0
040 $a GP $c GP
041 0 $a eng
050 4 $a B105.M53
072 7 $a HPM $2 bicssc
072 7 $a PHI015000 $2 bisacsh
072 7 $a QDTM $2 thema
082 0 4 $a 128.2 $2 23
090 $a B105.M53 $b A547 2022
100 1 $a Anderson, Jane. $3 3602456
245 1 0 $a Biological naturalism and the mind-body problem $h [electronic resource] / $c by Jane Anderson.
260 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Palgrave Macmillan, $c 2022.
300 $a xii, 295 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
338 $a online resource $b cr $2 rdacarrier
505 0 $a Chapter 1. Introduction -- Chapter 2. The Explanatory Gap -- Chapter 3. The Hard and The Easy Problems Of Consciousness -- Chapter 4. (Un)consciousness and (Ir)rationality In Psychology -- Chapter 5. The Brain and The Mind-Body-Self -- Chapter 6. 21st Century Biological Naturalism: The Body-Map-Based View and the Affect-Centric View.
520 $a This book offers a new theoretical framework within which to understand "the mind-body problem". The crux of this problem is phenomenal experience, which Thomas Nagel famously described as "what it is like" to be a certain living creature. David Chalmers refers to the problem of "what-it-is-like" as "the hard problem" of consciousness and claims that this problem is so "hard" that investigators have either just ignored the issue completely, investigated a similar (but distinct) problem, or claimed that there is literally nothing to investigate - that phenomenal experience is illusory. This book contends that phenomenal experience is both very real and very important. Two specific "biological naturalist" views are considered in depth. One of these two views, in particular, seems to be free from problems; adopting something along the lines of this view might finally allow us to make sense of the mind-body problem. An essential read for anyone who believes that no satisfactory solution to "the mind-body problem" has yet been discovered.
650 0 $a Mind and body. $3 516332
650 1 4 $a Philosophy of Mind. $3 894953
650 2 4 $a Psychoanalysis. $3 519030
650 2 4 $a Cognitive Neuroscience. $3 3398985
710 2 $a SpringerLink (Online service) $3 836513
773 0 $t Springer Nature eBook
856 4 0 $u https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-99684-0
950 $a Religion and Philosophy (SpringerNature-41175)