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The Governance Role of Institutional...

Yegen, Eyub.

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The Governance Role of Institutional Investors.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The Governance Role of Institutional Investors./
Author:	Yegen, Eyub.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
Description:	190 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-02A.
Subject:	Finance. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28417018
ISBN:	9798522927578

The Governance Role of Institutional Investors.
Yegen, Eyub.

The Governance Role of Institutional Investors. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 190 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This thesis consists of chapters on the governance role of institutional investors. Chapter 1 provides an introduction of the three essays as well as provides a brief summary of their main findings. Chapter 2 examines whether certain types of institutional investors use their ownership rights as a mechanism of exerting influence on portfolio firms to amplify their political voice. We show that ownership may be an important mechanism through which institutional investors amplify their political influence. In particular, we find that the probability that a firm's Political Action Committee (PAC) donates to a politician supported by an investor's PAC nearly doubles after the investor acquires a large stake, and that it increases five-fold when the investor obtains a board seat. The relationship is stronger for private funds, and those with high partisanship, suggesting the relationship is driven by investor preferences rather than strategic concerns. Chapter 3 examines whether institutional investors may partially offset the social trade-offs due to outsourcing government services to private enterprises. Consistent with prior theoretical work, I find evidence that institutional investors, in particular investors with a long holding horizon, have a positive impact on social outcomes of privatized prisons. Overall this chapter provides evidence that social trade-offs due to privatization may be partially mitigated by institutional investors due to litigation and reputation risks. Chapter 3 examines whether institutional investors have an impact on product market outcomes. The empirical literature on the potential anti-competitive effects of common-ownership relies heavily on financial institution mergers to make causal inferences. I find that more than 85% of newly-formed common-ownership relationships due to such financial institution mergers are no longer commonly-held by the acquiring institution during the post-merger period (with most being liquidated in the first quarter following the merger). Firms that are no longer commonly-held by the merged institution drive the anti-competitive results found in previous studies. The fact that portfolio firms are so quickly rebalanced casts doubt on the utility of financial institution mergers as a natural experiment. Taken together, my thesis finds that institutional investors have a crucial governance role that benefits society.

ISBN: 9798522927578Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Governance

The Governance Role of Institutional Investors.
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