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Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus ...

Vucu, Simona Raluca.

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Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Self-agency and Self-motion: An Inquiry into the Medieval Metaphysics of Causal Powers.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Self-agency and Self-motion: An Inquiry into the Medieval Metaphysics of Causal Powers./
作者:	Vucu, Simona Raluca.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:	382 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-02A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10641101
ISBN:	9780438189270

Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Self-agency and Self-motion: An Inquiry into the Medieval Metaphysics of Causal Powers.
Vucu, Simona Raluca.

Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Self-agency and Self-motion: An Inquiry into the Medieval Metaphysics of Causal Powers. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 382 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2018.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

In the Physics, Aristotle argues that everything that moves is moved by something else, and thus that things cannot move themselves, in the sense of self-motion that refers not just to changing location, but also more generally to causing a change in oneself. This dissertation focuses on how, working within the framework of Aristotle's philosophy, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus defend the possibility of self-motion and self-agency (in contrast to self-motion, in self-agency a thing causes a feature in itself, but there is no temporal moment to which we can assign this causal fact). To understand Henry's and Scotus's defences of self-motion and self-agency, I consider their views about causal powers: in any case of causation, including self-motion and self-agency, things do what they do by exercising their causal powers. I argue that Henry and Scotus think very differently about the nature of powers and their causal contribution. Henry takes powers to be without causal efficacy, a view that pushes him to assign to them only an explanatory role, and to argue that in causation, what causes the change and what undergoes the change is the whole thing that has a power. In contrast, Scotus understands powers as forms, that is, as entities that can have direct causal efficacy, and thinks that in causation, what causes the change and what undergoes the change are these forms, which are parts of things. I further explain how Henry's and Scotus's views about causal powers are responsible for their different understandings of self-change. Because he focuses on how the whole thing is affected in a causal interaction, Henry is forced to conclude that in created beings, no perfect self-change is possible, for what starts the change and what ends it are not strictly the same. By focusing on the causal contribution of the parts of a thing, Scotus manages to bypass Henry's conundrum, and develops an account according to which things can change themselves in virtue of having active and passive principles by whose mutual manifestation a feature is produced by the self-agent in itself.

ISBN: 9780438189270Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Aquinas, Thomas

Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus on Self-agency and Self-motion: An Inquiry into the Medieval Metaphysics of Causal Powers.
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520 $a In the Physics, Aristotle argues that everything that moves is moved by something else, and thus that things cannot move themselves, in the sense of self-motion that refers not just to changing location, but also more generally to causing a change in oneself. This dissertation focuses on how, working within the framework of Aristotle's philosophy, Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus defend the possibility of self-motion and self-agency (in contrast to self-motion, in self-agency a thing causes a feature in itself, but there is no temporal moment to which we can assign this causal fact). To understand Henry's and Scotus's defences of self-motion and self-agency, I consider their views about causal powers: in any case of causation, including self-motion and self-agency, things do what they do by exercising their causal powers. I argue that Henry and Scotus think very differently about the nature of powers and their causal contribution. Henry takes powers to be without causal efficacy, a view that pushes him to assign to them only an explanatory role, and to argue that in causation, what causes the change and what undergoes the change is the whole thing that has a power. In contrast, Scotus understands powers as forms, that is, as entities that can have direct causal efficacy, and thinks that in causation, what causes the change and what undergoes the change are these forms, which are parts of things. I further explain how Henry's and Scotus's views about causal powers are responsible for their different understandings of self-change. Because he focuses on how the whole thing is affected in a causal interaction, Henry is forced to conclude that in created beings, no perfect self-change is possible, for what starts the change and what ends it are not strictly the same. By focusing on the causal contribution of the parts of a thing, Scotus manages to bypass Henry's conundrum, and develops an account according to which things can change themselves in virtue of having active and passive principles by whose mutual manifestation a feature is produced by the self-agent in itself.
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