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A Study of Quadratic Voting.

Liang, Philip Chijui.

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A Study of Quadratic Voting.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	A Study of Quadratic Voting./
Author:	Liang, Philip Chijui.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
Description:	91 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-01, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International83-01A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28412187
ISBN:	9798516958892

A Study of Quadratic Voting.
Liang, Philip Chijui.

A Study of Quadratic Voting. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 91 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-01, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Quadratic Voting (QV) is a promising technique for improving group decision-making by accounting for preference intensities. QV is a social choice mechanism in which voters buy votes for or against a proposal at a quadratic cost and the outcome with the most votes wins. In some cases, individuals are asymmetrically informed about the effects of legislation and therefore their valuations of legislation. For instance, anti-corruption legislation is the most beneficial to taxpayers and the most detrimental to corrupt officials when corruption opportunities are plentiful, but government officials have better information than taxpayers about how many corruption opportunities exist. I provide an example of a setting in a large population where QV does not achieve approximate efficiency despite majority voting achieving full efficiency. In this example, a society considers an anti-corruption policy that protects taxpayers from corruption by deterring corruption. Officials know whether corruption opportunities exist, but taxpayers are uncertain about whether corruption opportunities exist. I present surprising experimental results showing that in one case where theory predicts QV will perform poorly and majority voting will perform relatively well, QV performs much better than expected and is about as efficient as majority voting.

ISBN: 9798516958892Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Collective decisions

A Study of Quadratic Voting.
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100 1 $a Liang, Philip Chijui. $0 (orcid)ETDsite $3 3564094
245 1 0 $a A Study of Quadratic Voting.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2021
300 $a 91 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 83-01, Section: A.
500 $a Includes supplementary digital materials.
500 $a Advisor: Posner, Eric A.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2021.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a Quadratic Voting (QV) is a promising technique for improving group decision-making by accounting for preference intensities. QV is a social choice mechanism in which voters buy votes for or against a proposal at a quadratic cost and the outcome with the most votes wins. In some cases, individuals are asymmetrically informed about the effects of legislation and therefore their valuations of legislation. For instance, anti-corruption legislation is the most beneficial to taxpayers and the most detrimental to corrupt officials when corruption opportunities are plentiful, but government officials have better information than taxpayers about how many corruption opportunities exist. I provide an example of a setting in a large population where QV does not achieve approximate efficiency despite majority voting achieving full efficiency. In this example, a society considers an anti-corruption policy that protects taxpayers from corruption by deterring corruption. Officials know whether corruption opportunities exist, but taxpayers are uncertain about whether corruption opportunities exist. I present surprising experimental results showing that in one case where theory predicts QV will perform poorly and majority voting will perform relatively well, QV performs much better than expected and is about as efficient as majority voting.
590 $a School code: 0330.
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
650 4 $a Social research. $3 2122687
650 4 $a Accuracy. $3 3559958
650 4 $a Territorial transfers. $3 3564095
650 4 $a Corruption in government. $3 3564096
650 4 $a Equilibrium. $3 668417
650 4 $a Expenditures. $3 3556049
650 4 $a Efficiency. $3 753744
650 4 $a Securities fraud. $3 819550
650 4 $a Experiments. $3 525909
650 4 $a Society. $3 700566
650 4 $a Decision making. $3 517204
650 4 $a Election results. $3 3556048
650 4 $a State elections. $3 3564097
650 4 $a Legislation. $3 766385
650 4 $a Expected values. $3 3563993
650 4 $a Public officials. $3 3564098
653 $a Collective decisions
653 $a Electoral design
653 $a Market design
653 $a Quadratic voting
653 $a Welfare criteria
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0344
690 $a 0615
710 2 $a The University of Chicago. $b Economics. $3 1672980
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 83-01A.
790 $a 0330
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2021
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28412187