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Essays in Mechanism Design and Indus...

Yu, Yang.

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Essays in Mechanism Design and Industrial Organization.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Mechanism Design and Industrial Organization./
作者:	Yu, Yang.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2021,
面頁冊數:	67 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-12, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-12B.
標題:	Industrial engineering. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28491305
ISBN:	9798516059117

Essays in Mechanism Design and Industrial Organization.
Yu, Yang.

Essays in Mechanism Design and Industrial Organization. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2021 - 67 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-12, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2021.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In the first chapter of my dissertation, I study the enforcement of a cartel with private information about production cost under a static setting. I consider the problem of a cartel authority to implement the ex-post efficient production when facing a non-cooperative threat game (either Bertrand or Cournot). I show that, to implement an ex-post efficient allocation, paying minimum ex-ante subsidy forces the individual rationality constraint to be binding at an interior point under Cournot environment and binding at the lowest point under Bertrand environment. When marginal cost is drawn from a uniform distribution and market demand is large, this minimum ex-ante subsidy is higher in a Cournot environment than in a Bertrand environment.In the second chapter, I study the design of screening contracts for information products that are sold to a group of buyers who have strategic interactions with one another. An information provider offers a menu of information structures (i.e. experiments) to firms that compete in a downstream market. Firms can also obtain their own signals privately. The precision of own signals obtained is rm's private information (i.e. type). I first identify properties of a feasible menu under different strategic environments. I then study how the nature of competition between firms affect the information provider's optimal menu. Compared to an environment with no strategic interactions, the presence of strategic complementarities leads the information provider to perfectly correlate the information structures and provide most accurate information available. When firms face a game of strategic substitutes, the market may be partitioned into two segments and the information provided to the `high type' segment is degraded.

ISBN: 9798516059117Subjects--Topical Terms:

526216
Industrial engineering.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Mechanism design

Essays in Mechanism Design and Industrial Organization.
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506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a In the first chapter of my dissertation, I study the enforcement of a cartel with private information about production cost under a static setting. I consider the problem of a cartel authority to implement the ex-post efficient production when facing a non-cooperative threat game (either Bertrand or Cournot). I show that, to implement an ex-post efficient allocation, paying minimum ex-ante subsidy forces the individual rationality constraint to be binding at an interior point under Cournot environment and binding at the lowest point under Bertrand environment. When marginal cost is drawn from a uniform distribution and market demand is large, this minimum ex-ante subsidy is higher in a Cournot environment than in a Bertrand environment.In the second chapter, I study the design of screening contracts for information products that are sold to a group of buyers who have strategic interactions with one another. An information provider offers a menu of information structures (i.e. experiments) to firms that compete in a downstream market. Firms can also obtain their own signals privately. The precision of own signals obtained is rm's private information (i.e. type). I first identify properties of a feasible menu under different strategic environments. I then study how the nature of competition between firms affect the information provider's optimal menu. Compared to an environment with no strategic interactions, the presence of strategic complementarities leads the information provider to perfectly correlate the information structures and provide most accurate information available. When firms face a game of strategic substitutes, the market may be partitioned into two segments and the information provided to the `high type' segment is degraded.
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