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Essays in Matching Theory.

Altinok, Ahmet.

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Essays in Matching Theory.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Matching Theory./
作者:	Altinok, Ahmet.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	109 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-11A.
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27956607
ISBN:	9798645458225

Essays in Matching Theory.
Altinok, Ahmet.

Essays in Matching Theory. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 109 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-11, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Arizona State University, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

In this paper, I study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In such a setting, a natural question arises: Is it possible to analyze a dynamic many-to-one matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one market? First, I provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second, I show that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchings are "inferior" to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, I extend the model to allow agents on one side to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension, I provide a rationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the United States (US) medical residency matching market compared to the US college-admissions system.Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) are designed to improve the welfare of the poor. Group lending with joint liability is the standard contract used by these institutions. Such a contract performs two roles: it affects the composition of the groups that form, and determines the properties of risk-sharing among their members. Even though the literature suggests that groups consist of members with similar characteristics, there is evidence also of groups with heterogeneous agents. The underlying reason is that the literature lacked the risk-sharing behavior of the agents within a group. This paper develops a model of group lending where agents form groups, obtain capital from the MFI, and share risks among themselves. First, I show that joint liability introduces inefficiency for risk-averse agents. Moreover, the composition of the groups is not always homogeneous once risk-sharing is on the table.

ISBN: 9798645458225Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.
Subjects--Index Terms:

College admissions

Essays in Matching Theory.
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