東華大學圖書館 |

Essays on Strategic Thinking and Trading Behaviors.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Strategic Thinking and Trading Behaviors./
作者:	Zhou, Hang.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	121 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-06, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-06A.
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28002454
ISBN:	9798698524908

Essays on Strategic Thinking and Trading Behaviors.
Zhou, Hang.

Essays on Strategic Thinking and Trading Behaviors. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 121 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-06, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Davis, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Strategic thinking pervades human interactions. In a complex world where the consequences are determined by the joint actions of related groups, it is natural and sometimes critical to anticipate the reactions of others and take those into account. The most well-developed theory of strategic interaction is the game theoretical notion of Nash equilibrium. In this model, equilibrium is defined as the collection of strategies such that every player maximizes the expected payoff, given the strategy of others. In addition, the epistemic game theory finds mutual knowledge of rationality to be a necessary condition for Nash equilibrium.However, experimental economics have documented much evidence which challenges Nash equilibrium as the best prediction of strategic interactions. In addition, behavioral game theorists have developed several structural non-equilibrium models that systematically deviate from Nash equilibrium. For instance, the level-k thinking model and the cognitive hierarchy model both assume players adjust their strategies through iterated best responses. Both models introduce levels of sophistication, characterized by the rounds of iterated reasoning, as a predictor of strategic interactions. Experiments suggest that in general, these models outperform Nash equilibrium in terms of predicting the outcome of strategic interactions.My dissertation focuses on understanding the effect of strategic sophistication in market environments. Namely, I study how trading behaviors are determined by participants' levels of reasoning with an emphasis on financial markets.The first chapter of my dissertation investigates the effect of strategic reasoning on financial markets with a level-k thinking framework. A level-k speculator performs k rounds of iterative reasoning to infer information from asset prices. In contrast to the rational expectations equilibrium, the level-k framework produces a unified theory of momentum and contrarian trading strategies. I discuss how the distribution of sophistication levels affects several market variables and sheds new light on empirical patterns such as : (1) overreaction of asset prices, (2) the excess volatility puzzle, and (3) the excessive trading volume puzzle. Moreover, I find the sufficient conditions that thelevel-k strategy converges to the rational expectation equilibrium.The second chapter is joint work with Andr ́es Carvajal. In this paper, we incorporate the insight from level-k literature to a general equilibrium setting of financial markets. We ask the question whether suffcient sophistication on the reasoning of financial traders lead to rational expectations equilibrium and provides an answer. We study a simple exchange economy with complete markets and asymmetric information. Traders are classified as fundamentalists, who know the true probability distributions of random shocks, or speculators, who try to infer the true probabilities from asset prices. We characterize the necessary conditions on convergence to rational expectations equilibrium for some specific utility functions and discuss the general case. Our results are that: (1) convergence to rational expectations requires that speculators have less market impact than fundamentalists; (2) convergence, when it takes place, occurs in an oscillating manner; and (3) asset prices can be more volatile than at rational expectations equilibrium when speculators display low sophistication.The third chapter is joint work with Burkhard Schipper. In this paper, we consider the extension of level-k thinking to extensive-form games. Players may learn about their opponents' levels during the game because some information sets are not consistent with certain levels. In particular, for any information set reached, a level-k player attaches the maximum level-ℓ thinking for ℓ < k to her opponents consistent with the information set. We compare this new solution concept with existing solution concepts such as normal-form level-k thinking, backward induction, extensive-form rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We also analyze data from previous experiments as well as design our own experiments to identify player's extensive-form levels.The fourth chapter points out a mistake in the seminal work Kyle (1989). I discuss why the symmetric assumption is mistakenly imposed in Kyle (1989) and provide a correct characterization of the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

ISBN: 9798698524908Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Finance

Essays on Strategic Thinking and Trading Behaviors.
LDR:05500nmm a2200337 4500 001 2276897
005 20210510092435.5
008 220723s2020 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9798698524908
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI28002454
035 $a AAI28002454
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Zhou, Hang. $3 3544622
245 1 0 $a Essays on Strategic Thinking and Trading Behaviors.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2020
300 $a 121 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-06, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Carvajal, Andres.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Davis, 2020.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a Strategic thinking pervades human interactions. In a complex world where the consequences are determined by the joint actions of related groups, it is natural and sometimes critical to anticipate the reactions of others and take those into account. The most well-developed theory of strategic interaction is the game theoretical notion of Nash equilibrium. In this model, equilibrium is defined as the collection of strategies such that every player maximizes the expected payoff, given the strategy of others. In addition, the epistemic game theory finds mutual knowledge of rationality to be a necessary condition for Nash equilibrium.However, experimental economics have documented much evidence which challenges Nash equilibrium as the best prediction of strategic interactions. In addition, behavioral game theorists have developed several structural non-equilibrium models that systematically deviate from Nash equilibrium. For instance, the level-k thinking model and the cognitive hierarchy model both assume players adjust their strategies through iterated best responses. Both models introduce levels of sophistication, characterized by the rounds of iterated reasoning, as a predictor of strategic interactions. Experiments suggest that in general, these models outperform Nash equilibrium in terms of predicting the outcome of strategic interactions.My dissertation focuses on understanding the effect of strategic sophistication in market environments. Namely, I study how trading behaviors are determined by participants' levels of reasoning with an emphasis on financial markets.The first chapter of my dissertation investigates the effect of strategic reasoning on financial markets with a level-k thinking framework. A level-k speculator performs k rounds of iterative reasoning to infer information from asset prices. In contrast to the rational expectations equilibrium, the level-k framework produces a unified theory of momentum and contrarian trading strategies. I discuss how the distribution of sophistication levels affects several market variables and sheds new light on empirical patterns such as : (1) overreaction of asset prices, (2) the excess volatility puzzle, and (3) the excessive trading volume puzzle. Moreover, I find the sufficient conditions that thelevel-k strategy converges to the rational expectation equilibrium.The second chapter is joint work with Andr ́es Carvajal. In this paper, we incorporate the insight from level-k literature to a general equilibrium setting of financial markets. We ask the question whether suffcient sophistication on the reasoning of financial traders lead to rational expectations equilibrium and provides an answer. We study a simple exchange economy with complete markets and asymmetric information. Traders are classified as fundamentalists, who know the true probability distributions of random shocks, or speculators, who try to infer the true probabilities from asset prices. We characterize the necessary conditions on convergence to rational expectations equilibrium for some specific utility functions and discuss the general case. Our results are that: (1) convergence to rational expectations requires that speculators have less market impact than fundamentalists; (2) convergence, when it takes place, occurs in an oscillating manner; and (3) asset prices can be more volatile than at rational expectations equilibrium when speculators display low sophistication.The third chapter is joint work with Burkhard Schipper. In this paper, we consider the extension of level-k thinking to extensive-form games. Players may learn about their opponents' levels during the game because some information sets are not consistent with certain levels. In particular, for any information set reached, a level-k player attaches the maximum level-ℓ thinking for ℓ < k to her opponents consistent with the information set. We compare this new solution concept with existing solution concepts such as normal-form level-k thinking, backward induction, extensive-form rationalizability, and iterated admissibility. We also analyze data from previous experiments as well as design our own experiments to identify player's extensive-form levels.The fourth chapter points out a mistake in the seminal work Kyle (1989). I discuss why the symmetric assumption is mistakenly imposed in Kyle (1989) and provide a correct characterization of the symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
590 $a School code: 0029.
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
653 $a Finance
653 $a Level-k thinking
653 $a Strategic trading
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0508
710 2 $a University of California, Davis. $b Economics. $3 1674951
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 82-06A.
790 $a 0029
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2020
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28002454