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Management Going Concern Disclosure.

Wang, Jingjing.

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Management Going Concern Disclosure.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Management Going Concern Disclosure./
作者:	Wang, Jingjing.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
面頁冊數:	128 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-06, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-06A.
電子資源:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27997313
ISBN:	9798698544746

Management Going Concern Disclosure.
Wang, Jingjing.

Management Going Concern Disclosure. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 128 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-06, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

An entity's ability to continue as a going concern (GC), or the ability to fulfill obligations when they become due, is one of the key concerns of businesses, investors, and policymakers. My dissertation provides a comprehensive study of management GC disclosures and generates insights that are timely and highly policy-relevant. Chapter one examines management GC disclosures after the implementation of ASU 2014-15, a new accounting standard issued by the FASB requiring management to evaluate GC uncertainties quarterly and to provide disclosures in the notes to the financial statements. I first show that the market reacts negatively to such disclosures overall. More importantly, by employing highly detailed textual analysis to extract and categorize mitigation-plan discussions, I find that certain types of management mitigation plans are interpreted positively by investors, thereby alleviating the negative market reactions. These plans include selling assets, increasing liquidity through debt, equity, and grants, and revenue-enhancing strategies. Further, I demonstrate that management GC disclosures are associated with corporate failures and that mitigation-plan discussions can indicate firms' future viability.Chapter two focuses on management strategic behavior related to avoiding GC disclosures. Managers contemplate potential consequences to decide whether to disclose GC uncertainties. Chapter two explores how to separate "strategic firms" - companies with substantial doubt in GC but whose managers do not provide adequate disclosures - from "truthful firms." Employing a linguistic model built based on textual features extracted from the Q&A sections of conference calls for distressed firms, I demonstrate that the strategic executives talk longer and in a less negative tone. The strategic executives are more likely to use deceptive language and to mention non-GAAP measures and macroeconomic information and are less likely to discuss litigation and liquidity matters. I further extend the linguistic model to the non-distressed sample and predict the strategic scores indicating whether firms have GC uncertainties but withhold such disclosures. I find that the strategic firms are less likely to mention the word "going concern" in the financial reports and tend to increase their leverage after a new GC standard - ASU 2014-15 - was issued by the FASB.

ISBN: 9798698544746Subjects--Index Terms:

Accounting Standards

Management Going Concern Disclosure.
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