東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Divine Friendship-Love and Divine Im...

Feingold, Francis Emmanuel.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Divine Friendship-Love and Divine Impassibility: A Thomistic Response to Process Thought.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Divine Friendship-Love and Divine Impassibility: A Thomistic Response to Process Thought./
作者:	Feingold, Francis Emmanuel.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:	531 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International79-09A.
標題:	Philosophy of religion. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10682870
ISBN:	9780355662665

Divine Friendship-Love and Divine Impassibility: A Thomistic Response to Process Thought.
Feingold, Francis Emmanuel.

Divine Friendship-Love and Divine Impassibility: A Thomistic Response to Process Thought. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 531 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Catholic University of America, 2018.

This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.

Aquinas claims that God is pure actuality, and hence self-sufficient and immutable; process theists claim that a God who genuinely loves creatures must grieve at their ills. Because grief appears to imply the lover's potentiality, dependence, and mutability, both sides view these two claims as incompatible. I seek to show that, in fact, grief need not carry these implications, and that therefore a God who is pure actuality can grieve for our sins. I begin by arguing that sorrow for another's sin, as an act of the will, neither implies unfulfilled potency in the lover nor hinders the lover's joy in other goods. I grant, however, that such sorrow is in itself an unfulfilled, externally-dependent act, and therefore cannot be identical to God. Hence, if God grieves, this sorrow must inhere in him as a distinct reality-contrary to Aquinas's view that God is utterly simple, and therefore is identical to his action. My main task, then, is to show that affective acts (including sorrow) can inhere in God without either presupposing potency or positing limitation in his pure actuality. My first step is to expand on Aquinas's own claim that causal actions in general inhere in a peculiar, "weak" way, without intrinsically modifying their agent. An inhering causal action would hence introduce neither actualization nor limitation into the divine agent. Such actions do, however, still actualize ordinary agents in a different way: by constituting those agents' attainment to their external end. Next, therefore, I show that this "external" actualization applies only to agents whose nature is ordered to an external end-not to God, who is his sole end. If so, a causal action could inhere in God without actualizing him either intrinsically or extrinsically (which Aquinas denies). Third, I show that affective acts, in Aquinas's view, share the property responsible for "weak" inherence-namely, "existing-toward"-and that therefore they too would not intrinsically actualize or limit God by inhering in him. Lastly, I show that (again by Aquinas's own view) a lover can have multiple affective acts without being "moved"-and thus extrinsically actualized-by the individual objects of those acts. If so, then God could have an act of sorrow without himself being either modified or fulfilled thereby.

ISBN: 9780355662665Subjects--Topical Terms:

2079698
Philosophy of religion.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Aquinas

Divine Friendship-Love and Divine Impassibility: A Thomistic Response to Process Thought.
LDR:03684nmm a2200421 4500 001 2274502
005 20201202130009.5
008 220629s2018 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9780355662665
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10682870
035 $a (MiAaPQ)cua:10844
035 $a AAI10682870
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Feingold, Francis Emmanuel. $3 3551994
245 1 0 $a Divine Friendship-Love and Divine Impassibility: A Thomistic Response to Process Thought.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2018
300 $a 531 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Hoffmann, Tobias.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Catholic University of America, 2018.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a Aquinas claims that God is pure actuality, and hence self-sufficient and immutable; process theists claim that a God who genuinely loves creatures must grieve at their ills. Because grief appears to imply the lover's potentiality, dependence, and mutability, both sides view these two claims as incompatible. I seek to show that, in fact, grief need not carry these implications, and that therefore a God who is pure actuality can grieve for our sins. I begin by arguing that sorrow for another's sin, as an act of the will, neither implies unfulfilled potency in the lover nor hinders the lover's joy in other goods. I grant, however, that such sorrow is in itself an unfulfilled, externally-dependent act, and therefore cannot be identical to God. Hence, if God grieves, this sorrow must inhere in him as a distinct reality-contrary to Aquinas's view that God is utterly simple, and therefore is identical to his action. My main task, then, is to show that affective acts (including sorrow) can inhere in God without either presupposing potency or positing limitation in his pure actuality. My first step is to expand on Aquinas's own claim that causal actions in general inhere in a peculiar, "weak" way, without intrinsically modifying their agent. An inhering causal action would hence introduce neither actualization nor limitation into the divine agent. Such actions do, however, still actualize ordinary agents in a different way: by constituting those agents' attainment to their external end. Next, therefore, I show that this "external" actualization applies only to agents whose nature is ordered to an external end-not to God, who is his sole end. If so, a causal action could inhere in God without actualizing him either intrinsically or extrinsically (which Aquinas denies). Third, I show that affective acts, in Aquinas's view, share the property responsible for "weak" inherence-namely, "existing-toward"-and that therefore they too would not intrinsically actualize or limit God by inhering in him. Lastly, I show that (again by Aquinas's own view) a lover can have multiple affective acts without being "moved"-and thus extrinsically actualized-by the individual objects of those acts. If so, then God could have an act of sorrow without himself being either modified or fulfilled thereby.
590 $a School code: 0043.
650 4 $a Philosophy of religion. $2 bicssc $3 2079698
650 4 $a Metaphysics. $3 517082
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
653 $a Aquinas
653 $a Divine simplicity
653 $a Divine suffering
653 $a Hartshorne
653 $a Immutability
653 $a Impassibility
690 $a 0322
690 $a 0396
690 $a 0422
710 2 $a The Catholic University of America. $b Philosophy. $3 1669622
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 79-09A.
790 $a 0043
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2018
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10682870