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Fighting, Bargaining, and War Termin...

Beard, Steven Matthew.

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Fighting, Bargaining, and War Termination: Examining How Battlefield Factors Affect When Negotiations Can End Interstate Wars.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Fighting, Bargaining, and War Termination: Examining How Battlefield Factors Affect When Negotiations Can End Interstate Wars./
Author:	Beard, Steven Matthew.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
Description:	351 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-04A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13897339
ISBN:	9781085799850

Fighting, Bargaining, and War Termination: Examining How Battlefield Factors Affect When Negotiations Can End Interstate Wars.
Beard, Steven Matthew.

Fighting, Bargaining, and War Termination: Examining How Battlefield Factors Affect When Negotiations Can End Interstate Wars. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 351 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-04, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Colorado at Boulder, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

How do interstate wars end? I explore this question in my dissertation by developing the bargaining model of war (e.g. Fearon 1995, Powell 2006, Wagner 2000, Filson and Werner 2002 and others) to include a more detailed account of war processes. In particular, I examine how military strategy affects interstate bargaining and how this relates to war termination. Several significant developments emerge from this examination. First, it becomes apparent that there are in fact two fundamentally different bargaining situations in interstate wars. Ground wars occur where the states attempt to take and hold territory and can achieve their objectives militarily. Bombardment wars occur when the states only inflict costs on their opponent through air or artillery bombardment, and must rely on their opponent voluntarily making concessions to achieve any changes to the status quo. Second, examining war termination relative to the military situation at the end of the war shows that standard bargaining explanations fail to adequately explain the actual end of most wars. Wars typically end before credible commitment issues have been fully resolved. However, most wars do not appear to involve freely negotiated settlements, as war outcomes tend not to be intermediate to the two sides' war aims and tend not to involve one side making preemptive concessions before they have been militarily lost. I argue that in ground wars, defensive advantages present commitment problems internal to the war, inhibiting war termination until one side has achieved their war aims. However, once one side, and particularly the stronger, has achieved their war aims, defensive advantages actually cement a war ending settlement. Finally, bombardment wars must end with the revelation of private information, as the combatants cannot achieve their aims militarily. However, revealing this information is difficult, as individual engagements reveal very little information. Precipitating events may thus be necessary to prompt the end of bombardment wars. I empirically test these theories with originally coded data on military campaign outcomes. I supplement the quantitative analysis with multiple case studies, demonstrating that the hypothesized mechanism does occur.

ISBN: 9781085799850Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Bargaining model of war

Fighting, Bargaining, and War Termination: Examining How Battlefield Factors Affect When Negotiations Can End Interstate Wars.
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245 1 0 $a Fighting, Bargaining, and War Termination: Examining How Battlefield Factors Affect When Negotiations Can End Interstate Wars.
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506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a How do interstate wars end? I explore this question in my dissertation by developing the bargaining model of war (e.g. Fearon 1995, Powell 2006, Wagner 2000, Filson and Werner 2002 and others) to include a more detailed account of war processes. In particular, I examine how military strategy affects interstate bargaining and how this relates to war termination. Several significant developments emerge from this examination. First, it becomes apparent that there are in fact two fundamentally different bargaining situations in interstate wars. Ground wars occur where the states attempt to take and hold territory and can achieve their objectives militarily. Bombardment wars occur when the states only inflict costs on their opponent through air or artillery bombardment, and must rely on their opponent voluntarily making concessions to achieve any changes to the status quo. Second, examining war termination relative to the military situation at the end of the war shows that standard bargaining explanations fail to adequately explain the actual end of most wars. Wars typically end before credible commitment issues have been fully resolved. However, most wars do not appear to involve freely negotiated settlements, as war outcomes tend not to be intermediate to the two sides' war aims and tend not to involve one side making preemptive concessions before they have been militarily lost. I argue that in ground wars, defensive advantages present commitment problems internal to the war, inhibiting war termination until one side has achieved their war aims. However, once one side, and particularly the stronger, has achieved their war aims, defensive advantages actually cement a war ending settlement. Finally, bombardment wars must end with the revelation of private information, as the combatants cannot achieve their aims militarily. However, revealing this information is difficult, as individual engagements reveal very little information. Precipitating events may thus be necessary to prompt the end of bombardment wars. I empirically test these theories with originally coded data on military campaign outcomes. I supplement the quantitative analysis with multiple case studies, demonstrating that the hypothesized mechanism does occur.
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