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Repatriation and Renegotiation: Acti...

Jiang, Danyang.

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Repatriation and Renegotiation: Action-Specific Covenants and Firms? Responses to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Repatriation and Renegotiation: Action-Specific Covenants and Firms? Responses to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004./
Author:	Jiang, Danyang.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
Description:	85 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-08, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-08A.
Subject:	Accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27725716
ISBN:	9781392771068

Repatriation and Renegotiation: Action-Specific Covenants and Firms? Responses to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.
Jiang, Danyang.

Repatriation and Renegotiation: Action-Specific Covenants and Firms? Responses to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 85 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-08, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This paper investigates the renegotiation of action-specific covenants under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA). I examine whether firms are more likely to renegotiate their dividend and capital expenditure covenants due to the repatriation of foreign earnings. I document that dividend covenants prevent firms from repatriating foreign earnings, and capital expenditure covenants do not significantly affect repatriation decisions. More importantly, repatriating firms are more likely to renegotiate and relax dividend covenants, yet state-contingent thresholds in these covenants are shown to reduce the probability of renegotiation. I also find evidence that firms, especially those with high growth opportunities, are more likely to renegotiate and relax their capital expenditure restrictions after repatriation. I document that repatriating firms do not increase their payout or capital expenditures after relaxing covenant limits compared to non-repatriating firms. My findings suggest that borrowers renegotiate the action-restrictions with the lenders without covenant violation concerns. This study also sheds light on the role of state-contingent covenant thresholds in debt contracting literature and improves our understanding of the implications of action-specific covenants for tax policies.

ISBN: 9781392771068Subjects--Topical Terms:

557516
Accounting.

Repatriation and Renegotiation: Action-Specific Covenants and Firms? Responses to the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004.
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520 $a This paper investigates the renegotiation of action-specific covenants under the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (AJCA). I examine whether firms are more likely to renegotiate their dividend and capital expenditure covenants due to the repatriation of foreign earnings. I document that dividend covenants prevent firms from repatriating foreign earnings, and capital expenditure covenants do not significantly affect repatriation decisions. More importantly, repatriating firms are more likely to renegotiate and relax dividend covenants, yet state-contingent thresholds in these covenants are shown to reduce the probability of renegotiation. I also find evidence that firms, especially those with high growth opportunities, are more likely to renegotiate and relax their capital expenditure restrictions after repatriation. I document that repatriating firms do not increase their payout or capital expenditures after relaxing covenant limits compared to non-repatriating firms. My findings suggest that borrowers renegotiate the action-restrictions with the lenders without covenant violation concerns. This study also sheds light on the role of state-contingent covenant thresholds in debt contracting literature and improves our understanding of the implications of action-specific covenants for tax policies.
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