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Why Do Autocrats Decentralize?

Xiao, Yu.

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Why Do Autocrats Decentralize?

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Why Do Autocrats Decentralize?/
作者:	Xiao, Yu.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	326 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-08, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-08A.
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13898798
ISBN:	9781392809327

Why Do Autocrats Decentralize?
Xiao, Yu.

Why Do Autocrats Decentralize? - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 326 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-08, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Economic decentralization has profound effects on a country's economic performance, but not all countries pursue decentralization. Why do some countries see decentralization as a better strategy for development than others? What political conditions facilitate or inhibit economic decentralization in autocracies? Studies that focus on democracies have largely reach a consensus that politically decentralized systems tend to pursue economic decentralization policies. This dissertation contends, however, that there is an opposite relationship in autocracies. Specifically, it is the politically centralized autocracies that are more likely to pursue economic decentralization policies. I argue that this difference is because in autocracies, economic decentralization policies often result from a top-down delegation process, as opposed to a bottom-up bargaining process that often prevails in democracies.This dissertation develops a game-theoretical model to analyze the top-down economic decentralization process in autocracies. I demonstrate that political centralization can make the subnational government more willing to follow the national economic agenda and consequently make the national government more willing to decentralize economic resources. I test the theoretical model with a comparative case study of China from 1949 to 1962 and Mexico from 1917 to 1948. The Chinese case confirms that its centralized political system in the 1950s contributed to the economic decentralization policies during the Great Leap Forward. The Mexican case corroborates that its decentralized political system in the 1920s contributed to the Mexican federal government's consistent efforts to centralize economic resources at the federal level from the 1920s to the 1940s. A further test analyzes a sample of 59 countries from 1972 to 2016. The results support that political centralization reduces economic decentralization in democracies but facilitates economic decentralization in autocracies. The dissertation contributes to our understanding of the different patterns of economic decentralization and economic governance between democracies and autocracies.

ISBN: 9781392809327Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Authoritarian regimes

Why Do Autocrats Decentralize?
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