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Management opportunism in mergers an...

Lechner, Thomas Allen.

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Management opportunism in mergers and management buyouts: Evidence from accrual manipulation, economic activity and the bidding process.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Management opportunism in mergers and management buyouts: Evidence from accrual manipulation, economic activity and the bidding process./
Author:	Lechner, Thomas Allen.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 1998,
Description:	108 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 59-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International59-11A.
Subject:	Management accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9822160
ISBN:	9780591740103

Management opportunism in mergers and management buyouts: Evidence from accrual manipulation, economic activity and the bidding process.
Lechner, Thomas Allen.

Management opportunism in mergers and management buyouts: Evidence from accrual manipulation, economic activity and the bidding process. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 1998 - 108 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 59-11, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Buffalo, 1998.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The question of managerial opportunism is a fundamental one in both management and accounting. This paper examines the question in a setting particularly vulnerable to opportunities--attempted changes in corporate control. This paper combines several prior threads of literature to provide a more complete answer to this question. This portfolio approach is in the same spirit as Zmiejewski and Hagerman (1981), and extends it by considering both accounting and economic factors. DeAngelo (1986) and Perry and Williams (1994) examined manipulation of accounting accruals using standard univariate test. DeAngelo did not find manipulation; Perry and Williams did. Using a more current and broader sample, manipulation is not found in this paper for either MBOs or mergers when univariate tests are used. The one-dimensional accrual analysis of those papers are then extended to consider other factors that could explain the differences in results--financial distress, news, inside and outside block holdings, and prior year accrual reversals. The final analysis incorporating all these factors does not find accrual manipulation associated with MBOs. Accrual manipulation is found for mergers and financial distress. The lack of manipulation for MBOs using this more sensitive test supports the DeAngelo result more strongly. Accounting accrual manipulation is only one of a portfolio of possible managerial actions prior to a potential takeover. Expenditures could be altered by management prior to a potential change in control. Advertising, research and development and capital expenditures are examined. Consistent with the lack of opportunism in accruals, there is no opportunism found in advertising, research and development or capital expenditures. MBO managers are not depressing earnings, nor are merger managers enhancing them. Acquisition and disposition patterns do not differ significantly across MBOs, mergers and controls. Managers of potential targets are not enhancing their personal wealth by exchanging salary for options in significant amounts. Finally, MBO managers do not appear to be low-balling their initial bids. The evidence against managerial opportunism is substantial. The evidence from accounting accruals, economic expenditures, compensation and bidding process all indicate a lack of significant opportunism prior to a takeover bid.

ISBN: 9780591740103Subjects--Topical Terms:

1000435
Management accounting.

Management opportunism in mergers and management buyouts: Evidence from accrual manipulation, economic activity and the bidding process.
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