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Salesforce Compensation and CRM.

Kim, Minkyung.

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Salesforce Compensation and CRM.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Salesforce Compensation and CRM./
作者:	Kim, Minkyung.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	79 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-03A.
標題:	Marketing. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13808796
ISBN:	9781085777605

Salesforce Compensation and CRM.
Kim, Minkyung.

Salesforce Compensation and CRM. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 79 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

My dissertation studies salesforce incentives in CRM settings where salespeople are responsible for not only sales, but also customer maintenance. We use the unique panel data on customer loan acquisition and repayments linked to salespeople from a microfinance bank.In the first chapter, we investigate the dynamics in the effort-moral hazard tradeoff in response to multidimensional (acquisition and maintenance) performance incentives in the presence of private information. The results show that acquisition incentives induce salesperson moral hazard leading to adverse customer selection, but maintenance incentives moderate it as salespeople recognize the negative effects of acquiring low quality customers on future payoffs. Critically, without the moderating effect of maintenance incentives, the adverse selection effect of acquisition incentives overwhelms the sales enhancing effort effects, clarifying the importance of multidimensional incentives in CRM settings.The second chapter empirically explores questions of (i) how to allocate job task (specialization versus multi-tasking) in the presence of task complementarities and (ii) how to combine outcomes across tasks (e.g., additive versus multiplicative) in compensation plan design. To answer these questions, we develop the first structural model of a multi-tasking salesforce. The model incorporates three novel features, relative to the extant structural models of salesforce compensation: (i) multi-tasking effort choice given a multi-dimensional incentive plan; (ii) salesperson's private information about customers and (iii) dynamic intertemporal tradeoffs in effort choice across the two tasks. Estimates reveal two latent segments of salespeople - a hunter segment that is more efficient on loan acquisition and a farmer segment that is more efficient on loan collection. Counterfactual analyses show (i) that joint responsibility for acquisition and collection leads to better outcomes for the firm than specialized responsibilities even when salespeople are matched with their more efficient tasks and (ii) that aggregating performance on multiple tasks using an additive function leads to substantial adverse specialization of "hunters", where they specialize on acquisition at the expense of the firm, compared to the multiplicative form used by the firm.

ISBN: 9781085777605Subjects--Topical Terms:

536353
Marketing.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Salesforce incentive

Salesforce Compensation and CRM.
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