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Essays in Finance and Macroeconomics.

Xiang, Haotian.

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Essays in Finance and Macroeconomics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Finance and Macroeconomics./
作者:	Xiang, Haotian.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
面頁冊數:	112 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-03A.
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=13857509
ISBN:	9781085614306

Essays in Finance and Macroeconomics.
Xiang, Haotian.

Essays in Finance and Macroeconomics. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 112 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation consists of two chapters that address questions in finance and macroeconomics with quantitative theories.In the first chapter, I study how financial covenants influence firm behavior by state-contingently allocating decision rights to creditors. I develop a model with long-term debt where shareholders cannot commit to not dilute creditors in the future with new debt issuances and risky investments. Creditors intervene upon violations of covenant restrictions and restructure the debt without ex ante commitment. My quantitative analysis suggests that financial covenants significantly increase debt capacity, investment and ex ante firm value by disciplining shareholders. Nonetheless, I show that lenders' inability to commit to a restructuring plan severely impairs contractual efficiency. A further tightening of covenants, relative to the calibrated benchmark, improves their value.In the second chapter, I investigate the impact of bank capital requirements in a business cycle model with corporate debt choice. Compared to non-bank investors, banks provide restructurable loans that reduce firm bankruptcy losses and enhance production efficiency. Raising capital requirements reduces deposit insurance distortions but also deposit tax shields. As a result, firms cut back on both bank and non-bank borrowing while going bankrupt more frequently. Implementing an optimal capital ratio of 11 percent in the US produces limited marginal impacts on aggregate quantities and welfare.

ISBN: 9781085614306Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.

Essays in Finance and Macroeconomics.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.
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520 $a This dissertation consists of two chapters that address questions in finance and macroeconomics with quantitative theories.In the first chapter, I study how financial covenants influence firm behavior by state-contingently allocating decision rights to creditors. I develop a model with long-term debt where shareholders cannot commit to not dilute creditors in the future with new debt issuances and risky investments. Creditors intervene upon violations of covenant restrictions and restructure the debt without ex ante commitment. My quantitative analysis suggests that financial covenants significantly increase debt capacity, investment and ex ante firm value by disciplining shareholders. Nonetheless, I show that lenders' inability to commit to a restructuring plan severely impairs contractual efficiency. A further tightening of covenants, relative to the calibrated benchmark, improves their value.In the second chapter, I investigate the impact of bank capital requirements in a business cycle model with corporate debt choice. Compared to non-bank investors, banks provide restructurable loans that reduce firm bankruptcy losses and enhance production efficiency. Raising capital requirements reduces deposit insurance distortions but also deposit tax shields. As a result, firms cut back on both bank and non-bank borrowing while going bankrupt more frequently. Implementing an optimal capital ratio of 11 percent in the US produces limited marginal impacts on aggregate quantities and welfare.
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