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Strategic interaction between Islami...

Ismael, Nina.

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Strategic interaction between Islamist terror groups = a game theoretic approach /

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Strategic interaction between Islamist terror groups/ by Nina Ismael.
其他題名:	a game theoretic approach /
作者:	Ismael, Nina.
出版者:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2020.,
面頁冊數:	xi, 91 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	Introduction -- On Terrorism -- Terrorism as a Mode of Warfare -- The Economics of Terrorism -- Competition Between Homogeneous Terrorist Organizations: A General Model -- Al-Qaeda and Daesh: The Rise of the Islamic State -- Conclusion.
Contained By:	Springer Nature eBook
標題:	Terrorism - Economic aspects. -
電子資源:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8
ISBN:	9783030513078

Strategic interaction between Islamist terror groups = a game theoretic approach /
Ismael, Nina.

Strategic interaction between Islamist terror groupsa game theoretic approach /[electronic resource] :by Nina Ismael. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2020. - xi, 91 p. :ill. (some col.), digital ;24 cm. - SpringerBriefs in economics,2191-5504. - SpringerBriefs in economics..

Introduction -- On Terrorism -- Terrorism as a Mode of Warfare -- The Economics of Terrorism -- Competition Between Homogeneous Terrorist Organizations: A General Model -- Al-Qaeda and Daesh: The Rise of the Islamic State -- Conclusion.

This book applies game theory to the phenomenon of terrorism and investigates how the competition for support can influence the attack behavior of terror organizations. In addition, it examines the economics of terrorism. The so-called outbidding theory, which has become increasingly popular within the field of terrorism research, argues that terror groups vying for resources will engage in more and more violence to demonstrate their capabilities and commitment to their cause. This book challenges the outbidding concept by providing a game-theoretical analysis, which shows that a contest between two terror groups can be interpreted as a race for support. This interpretation may help explain why major attacks occur at all: not as a result of outbidding, but as a result of losing the race. In addition, the author shows that rivalry between terror groups does not necessarily lead to more attacks, but can result in less terrorism due to an increased probability of attack failure induced by the race. Lastly, the model is applied to the rivalry between al-Qaeda and Daesh, elaborated on with empirical evidence. Given its scope, the book is a must read for researches and scholars working in the fields of economics, politics, the social sciences, and military history, as well as military and political decision-makers and authorities working in the field of risk management.

ISBN: 9783030513078

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-51307-8doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

764024
Terrorism
--Economic aspects.

LC Class. No.: HV6431 / .I863 2020

Dewey Class. No.: 363.325

Strategic interaction between Islamist terror groups = a game theoretic approach /
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