東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Three Game Theoretic Models in Opera...

Zhang, Feng.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Three Game Theoretic Models in Operations Management.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Three Game Theoretic Models in Operations Management./
作者:	Zhang, Feng.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2010,
面頁冊數:	140 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 73-07, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International73-07B.
標題:	Systems science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3483870
ISBN:	9781124999005

Three Game Theoretic Models in Operations Management.
Zhang, Feng.

Three Game Theoretic Models in Operations Management. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2010 - 140 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 73-07, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong), 2010.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This thesis investigates three problems in operations management, by using different concepts and techniques in Game Theory. The first problem is a two-echelon supply chain problem involving wholesaling, transporting and retailing of certain kind of perishable product. A key characteristic of the problem is that the upstream supplier adopts a. Group Buying Scheme (GBS) as his pricing mechanism and the downstream retailers, taking into consideration of the supplier's pricing mechanism, their respective market demands and other retailers' likely reactions, compete with each other to maximize their profit respectively. We model this problem as a. Stackberg game where supplier is the leader and retailers are the followers. Furthermore, the retailers' optimal ordering problem is solved by applying the solution concepts in Competition Game Theory and we prove that the Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, the equilibrium is the only Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium and a strong equilibrium as well. Finally we show that the GBS pricing mechanism, as compared with the traditional Flat Price scheme, can bring the supplier and retailers to a win-win situation. The second is a project management problem with task subcontracting. The project owner (P0) outsources the tasks in his project to different subcontractors (SCs), with contracts to govern the completions of the tasks and the associated costs and bonus. We model the subcontractors' task processing problem as a Cooperative Game so that subcontractors can benefit by resource sharing and execution time rescheduling. We prove that our cooperative game is balanced and propose a core allocation vector constructed from the optimal dual solution. Meanwhile, the project owner's optimal strategy to design the contracts is also obtained by implicit optimization skills. The third problem we consider concerns about manufacturing outsourcing, where multiple manufacturers outsource their jobs to a third-party firm. The manufacturers book time windows from the third-party to process their jobs whose processing times are stochastic. Due to the capacity limitation of the third-party and the uncertainty in their processing times, it may be beneficial for the manufacturers to cooperate, provided that a proper cooperative mechanism can be devised. We model this problem as a Cooperative Game. However, it is more than a Sequencing Game commonly studied in the literature, because we consider the optimal booking decisions and the random processing times, which make it possible for the manufacturers to achieve a risk pooling effect by collaborating and booking together. We prove that the outsourcing game is balanced in the situation where the unit booking cost for each time window is unique. We also construct a core allocation based on the core vector derived form a Permutation Game. A main breakthrough is that the connective admissible rearrangement assumption is removed for the stochastic sequencing/booking game, following Slikker's technique.

ISBN: 9781124999005Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168411
Systems science.

Three Game Theoretic Models in Operations Management.
LDR:04137nmm a2200325 4500 001 2208702
005 20191028072737.5
008 201008s2010 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781124999005
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3483870
035 $a AAI3483870
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Zhang, Feng. $3 1043748
245 1 0 $a Three Game Theoretic Models in Operations Management.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2010
300 $a 140 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 73-07, Section: B.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Cai, Xianqiang.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong), 2010.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a This thesis investigates three problems in operations management, by using different concepts and techniques in Game Theory. The first problem is a two-echelon supply chain problem involving wholesaling, transporting and retailing of certain kind of perishable product. A key characteristic of the problem is that the upstream supplier adopts a. Group Buying Scheme (GBS) as his pricing mechanism and the downstream retailers, taking into consideration of the supplier's pricing mechanism, their respective market demands and other retailers' likely reactions, compete with each other to maximize their profit respectively. We model this problem as a. Stackberg game where supplier is the leader and retailers are the followers. Furthermore, the retailers' optimal ordering problem is solved by applying the solution concepts in Competition Game Theory and we prove that the Nash equilibrium always exists. Moreover, the equilibrium is the only Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium and a strong equilibrium as well. Finally we show that the GBS pricing mechanism, as compared with the traditional Flat Price scheme, can bring the supplier and retailers to a win-win situation. The second is a project management problem with task subcontracting. The project owner (P0) outsources the tasks in his project to different subcontractors (SCs), with contracts to govern the completions of the tasks and the associated costs and bonus. We model the subcontractors' task processing problem as a Cooperative Game so that subcontractors can benefit by resource sharing and execution time rescheduling. We prove that our cooperative game is balanced and propose a core allocation vector constructed from the optimal dual solution. Meanwhile, the project owner's optimal strategy to design the contracts is also obtained by implicit optimization skills. The third problem we consider concerns about manufacturing outsourcing, where multiple manufacturers outsource their jobs to a third-party firm. The manufacturers book time windows from the third-party to process their jobs whose processing times are stochastic. Due to the capacity limitation of the third-party and the uncertainty in their processing times, it may be beneficial for the manufacturers to cooperate, provided that a proper cooperative mechanism can be devised. We model this problem as a Cooperative Game. However, it is more than a Sequencing Game commonly studied in the literature, because we consider the optimal booking decisions and the random processing times, which make it possible for the manufacturers to achieve a risk pooling effect by collaborating and booking together. We prove that the outsourcing game is balanced in the situation where the unit booking cost for each time window is unique. We also construct a core allocation based on the core vector derived form a Permutation Game. A main breakthrough is that the connective admissible rearrangement assumption is removed for the stochastic sequencing/booking game, following Slikker's technique.
590 $a School code: 1307.
650 4 $a Systems science. $3 3168411
650 4 $a Operations research. $3 547123
690 $a 0790
690 $a 0796
710 2 $a The Chinese University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong). $3 1017547
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 73-07B.
790 $a 1307
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2010
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3483870