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Intermodal Maritime Container Securi...

Gordon, Gary A.

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Intermodal Maritime Container Security: A Multifactor Framework for Assessing Routing Risk.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Intermodal Maritime Container Security: A Multifactor Framework for Assessing Routing Risk./
Author:	Gordon, Gary A.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
Description:	164 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International80-03B(E).
Subject:	Civil engineering. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=11003890
ISBN:	9780438576865

Intermodal Maritime Container Security: A Multifactor Framework for Assessing Routing Risk.
Gordon, Gary A.

Intermodal Maritime Container Security: A Multifactor Framework for Assessing Routing Risk. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 164 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Massachusetts Lowell, 2018.

Intermodal container maritime security is layered and is comprised of physical security measures, vetting programs and processes, and regulations both domestic and international. Inspecting all of the containers entering the U.S., which is an obvious physical security measure, is virtually impossible according to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of DHS and other sources. Hence, the importance of a layered security process. Also, and because of the many companies, facilities and countries involved, and the interrelationships and dependencies of the three security measures and processes, there are opportunities for smuggling, and error and compromise of what is shipped in the containers.

ISBN: 9780438576865Subjects--Topical Terms:

860360
Civil engineering.

Intermodal Maritime Container Security: A Multifactor Framework for Assessing Routing Risk.
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100 1 $a Gordon, Gary A. $3 3432139
245 1 0 $a Intermodal Maritime Container Security: A Multifactor Framework for Assessing Routing Risk.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2018
300 $a 164 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: B.
500 $a Adviser: Chronis Stamatiadis.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Massachusetts Lowell, 2018.
520 $a Intermodal container maritime security is layered and is comprised of physical security measures, vetting programs and processes, and regulations both domestic and international. Inspecting all of the containers entering the U.S., which is an obvious physical security measure, is virtually impossible according to the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of DHS and other sources. Hence, the importance of a layered security process. Also, and because of the many companies, facilities and countries involved, and the interrelationships and dependencies of the three security measures and processes, there are opportunities for smuggling, and error and compromise of what is shipped in the containers.
520 $a Security measures employed are multipurpose focusing on interdicting the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or components to make them, drugs or other contraband. The latter two could be associated with funding terrorism in addition to having other negative impacts on the U.S. and its people. Smuggling a WMD into the U.S. or WMD components to be assembled in the U.S. could have far-reaching effects, to include mass casualties and economic disruption. From the research conducted herein, no one single security measure can prevent the intermodal maritime supply chain from being compromised, whether by a WMD or other contraband, but a layered approach could minimize if not eliminate the risk. Protecting the imported products that may have the potential of being tampered with or perhaps even stolen is important.
520 $a To address this, a practitioner-focused, universal and simple risk assessment framework should be considered that reflects the perspective of the intermodal maritime container supply chain partners. The target audience is any partner in the supply chain and government agencies both domestic and international. Research has shown that a vast majority of the risk assessment models employed in the transportation industry, regardless of mode, are data and resource intensive, theoretical and analytically driven. One railroad model, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) required Rail Corridor Risk Assessment Model (RCRMS) for hazardous material transportation, is so complex and data intensive, the larger railroads are begrudgingly using it. The smaller railroads can't easily afford the cost associated with running it although mandated. An aviation risk assessment model discussed in a RAND Corporation report is data intensive relying on over 4,000 input variables.
520 $a When analysis takes over as the focus of a risk assessment model, it is time to look for a framework or model that is not as theoretically and analytically focused. The model should reflect the needs of industry to assess risk in a timely manner. Not using the models because of their burdensome nature is a vulnerability that could weaken security. Recognizing this, the framework developed herein is subjective in nature relying on the intermodal maritime container supply chain and its "players" expertise and experience using the principles of a U.S. Army CARVER targeting model to generate route and segment priorities to be used in decision making. The subjective assessments will generate numeric values to quantitatively present the risk involved so that a comparative analysis can be made of routes or segments within the routes.
520 $a The U.S. Army CARVER model is focused on the target selection factors of Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect and Recognizability; hence the acronym CARVER. For each factor, there are conditions that allow the expert user to subjectively assign values from 1 to 10 to determine target value. For this research, the principles of CARVER are used to reflect the vulnerability of and risk associated with the intermodal maritime supply chain. For the Maritime CARVER framework, the factors were retooled from a targeting to a targeted perspective to reflect what could compromise the security of the intermodal maritime supply chain. The factors developed for the Maritime CARVER framework are Chain of custody, Approach (to targeting), Routing, Vetting, Exposure and Regulatory. Because of the difference in operations between the land and sea transportation modes, the Approach, Routing and Exposure factors have separate conditions and tables for each to assess the values.
520 $a A test case employing an open source route with synthesized data was used to develop the framework and look at the security of the supply chain from manufacturer, through the land transportation to and through the ports, and at sea. From the framework built in the test case, a case study for a German chemical manufacturer shipping from Hamburg was developed on a non-attributed basis. From both "runs", it was determined that the highest risk was transiting the Panama Canal, but the risk for the segment from the manufacturer and transportation to the port cannot be ignored. The sea voyage was found to be comparatively safe, but constricted areas, such as canals and straits, offered the potential for compromise heightening the risk. Areas of known threat, such as the Strait of Malacca and off the coast of Somalia, also pose a risk.
520 $a It was further learned that shipping out of ports and in countries that employ security measures in partnership with the U.S. or have measures that are similar to that of the U.S. enhance the security and reduce the risk. The U.S. government and its many agencies involved have extensive regulations that are the foundation of the processes and physical security measures used to reduce risk. When coupled with that of international maritime organizations, security is enhanced. But there is always the risk of an insider threat and cyber attacks, especially given today's events. This could result in the vetting process being impacted, data being compromised and even vessel operations and tracking being impacted. All of this contributes to the risk.
520 $a The framework developed herein is intended to be used by any party in the intermodal maritime container supply chain, as well as government agencies, to quickly assess routes, suppliers, shipping lines, ports, etc. This assessment, which is industry expert driven, could be used to evaluate a route, route segment or port; respond to recently developed intelligence, address the failure of a partner or container to be properly vetted; or respond to a security incident at a port or in a given sea lane. This would allow a supply chain partner to make appropriate changes. A future for the framework could be to provide the intermodal maritime container supply chain partners with a simple dashboard application to be used on PCs, tablets and iPads for easy use in the field and at sea to provide a "field expedient" assessment and decision.
520 $a Key words: Intermodal maritime supply chain security, port and maritime security, practitioner-focused risk assessment, weapons of mass destruction, contraband smuggling.
590 $a School code: 0111.
650 4 $a Civil engineering. $3 860360
650 4 $a Transportation. $3 555912
690 $a 0543
690 $a 0709
710 2 $a University of Massachusetts Lowell. $3 1017839
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 80-03B(E).
790 $a 0111
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2018
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=11003890