東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Anti-corruption agencies, multiple p...

Branduse, Diana-Maria.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Anti-corruption agencies, multiple principals, and the institutional framework.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Anti-corruption agencies, multiple principals, and the institutional framework./
作者:	Branduse, Diana-Maria.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
面頁冊數:	128 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-12(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-12A(E).
標題:	Political science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10133569
ISBN:	9781339921440

Anti-corruption agencies, multiple principals, and the institutional framework.
Branduse, Diana-Maria.

Anti-corruption agencies, multiple principals, and the institutional framework. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 128 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, 2016.

Over the recent decades, anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) have become an institutional feature of an ever-increasing number of world states. This dissertation proposes a theoretical framework for considering conditions under which anti-corruption agencies emerge as effective institutional actors. To that end, the following chapters assess more in-depth the impact of the legislative-executive context within which ACAs function on their effectiveness, as well as the impact of other accountability bodies or of external donors on the functioning or design of these agencies. In essence this project claims that ACAs always depend on some other institutional actor(s) for their top appointments, financial resources or oversight (which act similarly to principals for the ACAs). I would therefore expect anti-corruption bodies that are controlled by multiple principals with low incentives of collusion among themselves to be more effective. In addition to this, and based on an argument proposed by O'Donnell (1999), ACAs are also expected to be more effective when embedded in supporting networks of horizontal accountability. Finally, the existence of multiple principals can be tied to an opening up in the bargaining space triggered by the presence of external donors.

ISBN: 9781339921440Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.

Anti-corruption agencies, multiple principals, and the institutional framework.
LDR:02652nmm a2200325 4500 001 2202509
005 20190510142249.5
008 201008s2016 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781339921440
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10133569
035 $a (MiAaPQ)binghamton:12192
035 $a AAI10133569
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Branduse, Diana-Maria. $3 3429265
245 1 0 $a Anti-corruption agencies, multiple principals, and the institutional framework.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2016
300 $a 128 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: William B. Heller.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, 2016.
520 $a Over the recent decades, anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) have become an institutional feature of an ever-increasing number of world states. This dissertation proposes a theoretical framework for considering conditions under which anti-corruption agencies emerge as effective institutional actors. To that end, the following chapters assess more in-depth the impact of the legislative-executive context within which ACAs function on their effectiveness, as well as the impact of other accountability bodies or of external donors on the functioning or design of these agencies. In essence this project claims that ACAs always depend on some other institutional actor(s) for their top appointments, financial resources or oversight (which act similarly to principals for the ACAs). I would therefore expect anti-corruption bodies that are controlled by multiple principals with low incentives of collusion among themselves to be more effective. In addition to this, and based on an argument proposed by O'Donnell (1999), ACAs are also expected to be more effective when embedded in supporting networks of horizontal accountability. Finally, the existence of multiple principals can be tied to an opening up in the bargaining space triggered by the presence of external donors.
520 $a In order to assess these claims, I rely on both new and existing cross-national data. An additional contribution of this project is therefore represented by a data collection effort on anti-corruption agencies, which has resulted in a dataset with objective information on ACA principals and other features. These data are also described in the subsequent chapters.
590 $a School code: 0792.
650 4 $a Political science. $3 528916
650 4 $a Public policy. $3 532803
650 4 $a Education policy. $3 2191387
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0630
690 $a 0458
710 2 $a State University of New York at Binghamton. $b Political Science. $3 1028043
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 77-12A(E).
790 $a 0792
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2016
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10133569