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Essays on Dynamic Agency, Inequality...

Phelan, Thomas Michael.

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Essays on Dynamic Agency, Inequality and Optimal Taxation.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Dynamic Agency, Inequality and Optimal Taxation./
Author:	Phelan, Thomas Michael.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
Description:	145 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International80-03A(E).
Subject:	Economic theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10934961
ISBN:	9780438566408

Essays on Dynamic Agency, Inequality and Optimal Taxation.
Phelan, Thomas Michael.

Essays on Dynamic Agency, Inequality and Optimal Taxation. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 145 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2018.

The distributions of both income and wealth in the United States are heavily skewed to the right, with tails that may be well approximated by power laws. Further, business owners are disproportionately represented at the top of these distributions and are exposed to a high degree of idiosyncratic risk. This thesis explores the extent to which these facts together suggest imperfect risk-sharing remediable through government policy, by characterizing efficient allocations and long-run inequality in two dynamic economies that separately analyze different factors affecting business output. The first chapter focuses on the role of human capital and the second on physical capital. In each case I assume business ownership is subject to a dynamic agency problem, with the utility of each firm owner and the output of their firm depending upon actions observable only to themselves. To induce owners to increase output, their consumption must depend upon the performance of their firm, and this limits the extent to which risk may be shared across society. In each environment I calculate the degree of long-run inequality consistent with maximizing average welfare, subject to the restrictions imposed by technological constraints and the presence of asymmetric information. I then explore how these allocations may be implemented when agents may trade assets in decentralized markets and taxes are imposed on various forms of income.

ISBN: 9780438566408Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Dynamic Agency, Inequality and Optimal Taxation.
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245 1 0 $a Essays on Dynamic Agency, Inequality and Optimal Taxation.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2018
300 $a 145 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 80-03(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Christopher Phelan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Minnesota, 2018.
520 $a The distributions of both income and wealth in the United States are heavily skewed to the right, with tails that may be well approximated by power laws. Further, business owners are disproportionately represented at the top of these distributions and are exposed to a high degree of idiosyncratic risk. This thesis explores the extent to which these facts together suggest imperfect risk-sharing remediable through government policy, by characterizing efficient allocations and long-run inequality in two dynamic economies that separately analyze different factors affecting business output. The first chapter focuses on the role of human capital and the second on physical capital. In each case I assume business ownership is subject to a dynamic agency problem, with the utility of each firm owner and the output of their firm depending upon actions observable only to themselves. To induce owners to increase output, their consumption must depend upon the performance of their firm, and this limits the extent to which risk may be shared across society. In each environment I calculate the degree of long-run inequality consistent with maximizing average welfare, subject to the restrictions imposed by technological constraints and the presence of asymmetric information. I then explore how these allocations may be implemented when agents may trade assets in decentralized markets and taxes are imposed on various forms of income.
590 $a School code: 0130.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a University of Minnesota. $b Economics. $3 1022416
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 80-03A(E).
790 $a 0130
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2018
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10934961