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Essays on Market Design.

Peralta, Esteban Javier.

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Essays on Market Design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Market Design./
作者:	Peralta, Esteban Javier.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
面頁冊數:	148 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-11A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10927869
ISBN:	9780438194397

Essays on Market Design.
Peralta, Esteban Javier.

Essays on Market Design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 148 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2018.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

This dissertation studies how and when the design and implementation of market allocations affects the market's ability to induce agents to participate and truthfully reveal their information. The first two chapters examine markets in which individuals are assigned to institutions by a central system that imposes constraints on the distribution of individuals. These constraints have become a common tool in centralized markets aiming to reduce the number of individuals assigned to some institutions. For example, the Japanese medical residency program has imposed quotas on urban regions that aim limit the number of residents assigned to them, and many school districts set caps on the number of students with certain characteristics that each public school can admit. I am interested in understanding what quotas can be achieved.

ISBN: 9780438194397Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Market Design.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Larry Samuelson.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2018.
506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
520 $a This dissertation studies how and when the design and implementation of market allocations affects the market's ability to induce agents to participate and truthfully reveal their information. The first two chapters examine markets in which individuals are assigned to institutions by a central system that imposes constraints on the distribution of individuals. These constraints have become a common tool in centralized markets aiming to reduce the number of individuals assigned to some institutions. For example, the Japanese medical residency program has imposed quotas on urban regions that aim limit the number of residents assigned to them, and many school districts set caps on the number of students with certain characteristics that each public school can admit. I am interested in understanding what quotas can be achieved.
520 $a The first chapter, entitled "Participation in matching markets with distributional constraints," argues that some existing markets might be failing to achieve their desired quotas because these quotas affect agents' incentives to participate. The chapter shows that the problem can be traced back to the use of deterministic mechanisms and sheds some light on whether and when the use of lotteries constitutes an effective re-design. The main observation of the chapter is that lotteries can achieve some, but not every, re-distribution. This suggests that the use of random mechanisms might be a useful, albeit limited, re-design.
520 $a The second chapter, entitled "Stability in matching markets with distributional constraints," argues that aggregate distributional constraints, such as the regional quotas imposed by the Japanese medical residency program, might create an externality-like effect that could undermine the market's ability to achieve its distributional goal. Indeed, in practice regional quotas are implemented by assigning a regional "share" to each institution, but multiple vectors of shares implement the same quotas. As a result, any given vector might be considered "unfair." I consider a stability notion -- denoted constrained stability -- that assumes regional quotas are binding but that regional shares cannot be enforced. Thus, constrained stability presumes that no agent or institution can be fairly forced to internalize the externality created by a given assignment of regional shares. My main result shows that a constrained stable outcome exists whenever agents' preferences are sufficiently aligned; namely, whenever every resident agrees on the most preferred hospital in every region and finds every other hospital unacceptable. Hence, constrained stable outcomes always exist in markets imposing "individual" distributional constraints -- like most school districts pursuing some affirmative action policy. In turn, the possible non-existence of constrained stable outcomes highlights that markets imposing aggregate distributional constraints must have the ability to enforce unfair shares. I also show that a modified version of deferred acceptance produces a constrained stable outcome whenever one exists and that these outcomes coincide in every region where the quota binds.
520 $a Finally, the third chapter, entitled Bayesian implementation with verifiable information," studies whether and when the ability of agents to prove their claims -- by presenting evidence -- enlarges the class of fully implementable allocations; namely, allocations that can be obtained as the outcome of some mechanism in all of its equilibria. I first show that generalizations of standard conditions -- namely, incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity - are jointly necessary, and sufficient for full implementation within a suitable class of environments. The sufficiency part constructs an indirect mechanism that exploits the presence of verifiable information by asking agents to report more than their information. A natural question is whether the presence of verifiable information can be exploited by the direct mechanism. My main observation suggests, however, that the answer is negative. That is, I show that whenever some profile of reports is verifiable but gives rise to an undesirable outcome, an allocation can be fully implemented by its direct mechanism only if is not incentive compatible in the absence of verifiable information. Since the use of indirect mechanisms is typically limited in most real applications, this result suggests that the presence of verifiable information might carry limited benefits.
590 $a School code: 0265.
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793 $a English
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