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Essays on Information Acquisition in...

Wang, Tao.

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Essays on Information Acquisition in Industrial Organization.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Information Acquisition in Industrial Organization./
作者:	Wang, Tao.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	83 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-04A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10607468
ISBN:	9780355415865

Essays on Information Acquisition in Industrial Organization.
Wang, Tao.

Essays on Information Acquisition in Industrial Organization. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 83 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 2017.

In the first part "Competitive Intelligence and Disclosure of Cost Information in Duopoly", I consider a duopoly in which one firm can invest in competitive intelligence (CI) to learn its rival's private cost before market competition. I show in equilibrium the firm invests in CI makes higher expected net profit than when it doesn't invest. Ex ante both the firm being "spied" and the industry benefit (suffer) from CI under Cournot (Bertrand) competition while consumer surplus suffers under both types of competition. Overall CI in this environment enhances (reduces) social welfare when firms compete in Cournot (Bertrand) fashion. When the firm that invests in CI can disclose its private signal about rival's cost credibly and costlessly, due to unraveling argument there's full disclosure in equilibrium under both Cournot and Bertrand competition and the main results still hold qualitatively. Disclosure of private signal can increase or decrease the firm's incentive to invest in CI, depending on the degree of convexity of the cost function associated with CI.

ISBN: 9780355415865Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Information Acquisition in Industrial Organization.
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520 $a In the first part "Competitive Intelligence and Disclosure of Cost Information in Duopoly", I consider a duopoly in which one firm can invest in competitive intelligence (CI) to learn its rival's private cost before market competition. I show in equilibrium the firm invests in CI makes higher expected net profit than when it doesn't invest. Ex ante both the firm being "spied" and the industry benefit (suffer) from CI under Cournot (Bertrand) competition while consumer surplus suffers under both types of competition. Overall CI in this environment enhances (reduces) social welfare when firms compete in Cournot (Bertrand) fashion. When the firm that invests in CI can disclose its private signal about rival's cost credibly and costlessly, due to unraveling argument there's full disclosure in equilibrium under both Cournot and Bertrand competition and the main results still hold qualitatively. Disclosure of private signal can increase or decrease the firm's incentive to invest in CI, depending on the degree of convexity of the cost function associated with CI.
520 $a In the second part "Information Acquisition, Signaling and Learning in Duopoly", I study firms' incentives to acquire private information in a duopoly signaling game. Due to signaling, firms' first-period equilibrium prices are distorted above the optimal static prices. It is show that while firms benefit from obtaining more precise private information, the value of information is reduced by the price distortion due to signaling. Thus, compared with firms that do not attempt to manipulate rivals' beliefs, signaling firms acquire less precise information. An industry-wide trade-association acquiring information increases firm profit and may also increase consumer surplus, so allowing such collective action may be in the interest of competition authorities.
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