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Essays in Stochastic Games and Mecha...

Urgun, Can.

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Essays in Stochastic Games and Mechanism Design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Stochastic Games and Mechanism Design./
作者:	Urgun, Can.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	186 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-03(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-03A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10285571
ISBN:	9780355294323

Essays in Stochastic Games and Mechanism Design.
Urgun, Can.

Essays in Stochastic Games and Mechanism Design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 186 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-03(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2017.

Chapter 1 focuses on contract manufacturing as a stochastic game between a client and contract manufacturers. Contract manufacturing enables intellectual property holders to enjoy scale economies, reduce labor costs and free up capital. However, in many scenarios contract manufacturing is a double-edged sword, rife with entrenchments, threats of predation or hold up. I explore these contract manufacturing problems in a non-recursive relational contract setting. These non-recursivities appear in at least two scenarios: First, a setting where there is learning by doing, but the accumulated expertise can also be used by the agent to compete against the principal. Second, a setting where there are multiple potential producers, but these contract manufacturers have prior entrenchments effecting their costs and can hold up the client. The analysis of these relations requires a novel methodological approach. A key contribution is that despite the non-recursive nature of these relationships, in both settings the principal optimal contract is characterized by a simple index rule, which does not depend on history or other agents.

ISBN: 9780355294323Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays in Stochastic Games and Mechanism Design.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-03(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Alvaro Sandroni.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2017.
520 $a Chapter 1 focuses on contract manufacturing as a stochastic game between a client and contract manufacturers. Contract manufacturing enables intellectual property holders to enjoy scale economies, reduce labor costs and free up capital. However, in many scenarios contract manufacturing is a double-edged sword, rife with entrenchments, threats of predation or hold up. I explore these contract manufacturing problems in a non-recursive relational contract setting. These non-recursivities appear in at least two scenarios: First, a setting where there is learning by doing, but the accumulated expertise can also be used by the agent to compete against the principal. Second, a setting where there are multiple potential producers, but these contract manufacturers have prior entrenchments effecting their costs and can hold up the client. The analysis of these relations requires a novel methodological approach. A key contribution is that despite the non-recursive nature of these relationships, in both settings the principal optimal contract is characterized by a simple index rule, which does not depend on history or other agents.
520 $a Chapter 2 focuses on the deciding the timing of a confrontation as a stochastic game between two players. This paper examines the effects of patience on ordinary conflicts such as divorce, price wars and commercial litigation. Players optimally decide when, if ever, to start a destructive confrontation. In the unique equilibrium, there is a tight connection between patience, aggressiveness and strength. In particular patience may lead to immediate confrontation (the most inefficient outcome). This inefficiency is caused by preemptive moves that deny option values to the opponent.
520 $a Chapter 3 focuses on bureaucracy and influence activities from the perspective of mechanism design. Bureaucracy and influence activities consume a great deal of managers' time and effort in an organization. These activities are surplus destroying in the sense that they produce no direct output or information. This paper suggests a positive role for these activities. We develop a model for allocation in internal capital markets that takes a mechanism design perspective and incorporates both costly inspection and money burning (e.g. bureaucracy, influence activities) as tools for the headquarters to pursue optimal allocations. We find that the optimal mechanism deploys both the instruments of costly inspection and money burning, often at the same time on an agent.
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