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Essays in Health Economics.

Albert, Jason.

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Essays in Health Economics.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Health Economics./
作者:	Albert, Jason.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2015,
面頁冊數:	92 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International76-11A.
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3700809
ISBN:	9781321709261

Essays in Health Economics.
Albert, Jason.

Essays in Health Economics. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015 - 92 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2015.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The first chapter studies a dynamic model of a fee-for-service healthcare system in which healthcare providers compete for patients by prescribing antibiotics. Using antibiotics limits antibiotic-treatable infections, but fosters the development of antibiotic-resistant infections. The chapter first demonstrates a 'Goldilocks' effect from competition. A perfectly competitive market for providers over-prescribes antibiotics because providers do not bear the cost of antibiotic-resistant infections. A patient monopolist under-prescribes antibiotics in order to increase the level of treatable infection. This is because while infection is a 'bad' for society, infection is a 'good' for a provider of antibiotics under a fee-for-service regime. Due to more moderate antibiotic use, oligopolistic competition can be the optimal market structure. The chapter then demonstrates how the model can be used for policy analysis by computing the optimal licensing regime, prescription quota, and tax on antibiotics. The second chapter studies a model in which court delay limits a court's ability to implement a welfare enhancing liability scheme. The model describes how court delay affects a firm's decision to enter a market and invest in worker safety. Workers are unaware of the risk at a particular firm, but can demand a wage that compensates for the expected risk of employment in the industry. Delay causes firms to under-invest in safety. When firms are symmetric, firms fully bear the burden of the under-investment in safety through the market wage. As delay increases, profits can decrease to the point that efficient firms do not enter the market. When firms are asymmetric, the wage over-compensates workers at the high-type firm and under-compensates workers at the low-type firm. As delay increases, this wage subsidy from a high-type to a low-type firm can increase and induce inefficient firms to enter the market. The model provides support for applying prejudgment interest to accident damages.

ISBN: 9781321709261Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essays in Health Economics.
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