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Essays in Information Design.

Liao, Xiaoye.

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Essays in Information Design.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in Information Design./
Author:	Liao, Xiaoye.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
Description:	182 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-02A.
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10750488
ISBN:	9780438171077

Essays in Information Design.
Liao, Xiaoye.

Essays in Information Design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 182 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2018.

This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.

Information design, or Bayesian persuasion, is one way to model and analyze the act of exploiting an informational advantage to affect others' decisions, and is also used to facilitate robust predictions of games with incomplete information. The basic idea of information design, embedded in setups capturing interesting economic interactions, provides sharpe insights into how the optimal information transmission is correlated with and/or is affecting other factors shaping players' incentives. In this dissertation I investigate this problem in two dynamic scenarios. In Chapter 1, I develop a theory on how the receiver's incentive to optimize information acquisition will affect the optimal provision of information. Specifically, I consider information design in a dynamic model where, unlike in standard Bayesian persuasion, the receiver can derive signals repeatedly from the strategically constructed but history-independent information structure and choose when to stop and take his irreversible action. Taking the 2-state-2-action environment with partially-aligned agents as the benchmark, we fully characterize the optimal information structure and find that it is optimal to fully disclose the truth for a large class of primitives. Moreover, we analyze how the optimal persuasion mechanism hinges on primitives. Finally, a comparison between my results and those obtained in models with one-shot learning reveals a wedge effect of optimal learning on the designer's welfare, and shows that the designer's expected utility at optimum is pressed down to the convex envelope of Bayesian boundaries. Some extensions of the benchmark model are discussed. In Chapter 2, I look at an economic design problem combining dynamic Bayesian persuasion and money transfers, which is also an application of information design in stress test. To be concrete, I study the problem of a government dynamically deciding how to optimally support a financial firm whose solvency is perceived to be in danger, so that the market is on the edge of withdrawing investment in it, thus jeopardizing its growth rate. Tools available to the government are fiscal interventions (i.e., a bailout) and the possibility of information disclosure regarding the firm's health (i.e., stress test). I characterize optimal interventions and study how fiscal interventions and information disclosure are used together. The optimal course of action is to bail out only firms of intermediate size and thereafter injects funds to ensure their solvency. Information disclosure (modeled via dynamic persuasion) will be employed before fiscal intervention and subsequent intervention is triggered only after the stress test reveals the firm's state. The optimal dynamic information structure is characterized under some technical conditions, which consists of a signal that identifies a poor firm, and the government immediately bails out the firm upon observing such a signal. I explore the relationship between these two policies and show that they are complements. Moreover, I examine when full and immediate information disclosure is optimal and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for its optimality.

ISBN: 9780438171077Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essays in Information Design.
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500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-02, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Stacchetti, Ennio.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2018.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a Information design, or Bayesian persuasion, is one way to model and analyze the act of exploiting an informational advantage to affect others' decisions, and is also used to facilitate robust predictions of games with incomplete information. The basic idea of information design, embedded in setups capturing interesting economic interactions, provides sharpe insights into how the optimal information transmission is correlated with and/or is affecting other factors shaping players' incentives. In this dissertation I investigate this problem in two dynamic scenarios. In Chapter 1, I develop a theory on how the receiver's incentive to optimize information acquisition will affect the optimal provision of information. Specifically, I consider information design in a dynamic model where, unlike in standard Bayesian persuasion, the receiver can derive signals repeatedly from the strategically constructed but history-independent information structure and choose when to stop and take his irreversible action. Taking the 2-state-2-action environment with partially-aligned agents as the benchmark, we fully characterize the optimal information structure and find that it is optimal to fully disclose the truth for a large class of primitives. Moreover, we analyze how the optimal persuasion mechanism hinges on primitives. Finally, a comparison between my results and those obtained in models with one-shot learning reveals a wedge effect of optimal learning on the designer's welfare, and shows that the designer's expected utility at optimum is pressed down to the convex envelope of Bayesian boundaries. Some extensions of the benchmark model are discussed. In Chapter 2, I look at an economic design problem combining dynamic Bayesian persuasion and money transfers, which is also an application of information design in stress test. To be concrete, I study the problem of a government dynamically deciding how to optimally support a financial firm whose solvency is perceived to be in danger, so that the market is on the edge of withdrawing investment in it, thus jeopardizing its growth rate. Tools available to the government are fiscal interventions (i.e., a bailout) and the possibility of information disclosure regarding the firm's health (i.e., stress test). I characterize optimal interventions and study how fiscal interventions and information disclosure are used together. The optimal course of action is to bail out only firms of intermediate size and thereafter injects funds to ensure their solvency. Information disclosure (modeled via dynamic persuasion) will be employed before fiscal intervention and subsequent intervention is triggered only after the stress test reveals the firm's state. The optimal dynamic information structure is characterized under some technical conditions, which consists of a signal that identifies a poor firm, and the government immediately bails out the firm upon observing such a signal. I explore the relationship between these two policies and show that they are complements. Moreover, I examine when full and immediate information disclosure is optimal and provide a necessary and sufficient condition for its optimality.
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650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
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