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Reason and emotion in international ...

Jeffery, Renee.

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Reason and emotion in international ethics

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Reason and emotion in international ethics/ Renee Jeffery.
remainder title:	Reason & Emotion in International Ethics
Author:	Jeffery, Renee.
Published:	Cambridge :Cambridge University Press, : 2014.,
Description:	ix, 252 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
[NT 15003449]:	1. Ethics, emotions, and the human brain -- 2. Rationalist cosmopolitan solutions to the problem of world poverty -- 3. Moral sentiment theory -- 4. The demise of moral sentiment theory -- 5. What is an emotion? -- 6. Moral judgment after neuroscience -- 7. A sentimental solution.
Subject:	Ethics, Modern. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139764407
ISBN:	9781139764407

Reason and emotion in international ethics
Jeffery, Renee.

Reason and emotion in international ethics[electronic resource] /Reason & Emotion in International EthicsRenee Jeffery. - Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2014. - ix, 252 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

1. Ethics, emotions, and the human brain -- 2. Rationalist cosmopolitan solutions to the problem of world poverty -- 3. Moral sentiment theory -- 4. The demise of moral sentiment theory -- 5. What is an emotion? -- 6. Moral judgment after neuroscience -- 7. A sentimental solution.

The study of international ethics is marked by an overwhelming bias towards reasoned reflection at the expense of emotionally driven moral deliberation. For rationalist cosmopolitans in particular, reason alone provides the means by which we can arrive at the truly impartial moral judgments a cosmopolitan ethic demands. However, are the emotions as irrational, selfish and partial as most rationalist cosmopolitans would have us believe? By re-examining the central claims of the eighteenth-century moral sentiment theorists in light of cutting-edge discoveries in the fields of neuroscience and psychology, Renee Jeffery argues that the dominance of rationalism and marginalisation of emotions from theories of global ethics cannot be justified. In its place she develops a sentimentalist cosmopolitan ethic that does not simply provide a framework for identifying injustices and prescribing how we ought to respond to them, but which actually motivates action in response to international injustices such as global poverty.

ISBN: 9781139764407Subjects--Topical Terms:

583358
Ethics, Modern.

LC Class. No.: BJ1031 / .J43 2014

Dewey Class. No.: 171.2

Reason and emotion in international ethics
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520 $a The study of international ethics is marked by an overwhelming bias towards reasoned reflection at the expense of emotionally driven moral deliberation. For rationalist cosmopolitans in particular, reason alone provides the means by which we can arrive at the truly impartial moral judgments a cosmopolitan ethic demands. However, are the emotions as irrational, selfish and partial as most rationalist cosmopolitans would have us believe? By re-examining the central claims of the eighteenth-century moral sentiment theorists in light of cutting-edge discoveries in the fields of neuroscience and psychology, Renee Jeffery argues that the dominance of rationalism and marginalisation of emotions from theories of global ethics cannot be justified. In its place she develops a sentimentalist cosmopolitan ethic that does not simply provide a framework for identifying injustices and prescribing how we ought to respond to them, but which actually motivates action in response to international injustices such as global poverty.
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