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The myth of Mao Zedong and modern in...

Grice, Francis.

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The myth of Mao Zedong and modern insurgency

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The myth of Mao Zedong and modern insurgency/ by Francis Grice.
Author:	Grice, Francis.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2019.,
Description:	xi, 219 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
[NT 15003449]:	1. Introduction -- 2. What Mao Actually Taught -- 3. The Unoriginal Mao -- 4. Mao and the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War -- 5. The Insignificant Mao -- 6. The Deification of Mao -- 7. Conclusion.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Insurgency - History - 20th century. - China -
Subject:	China - History - 1949-1976. -
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77571-5
ISBN:	9783319775715

The myth of Mao Zedong and modern insurgency
Grice, Francis.

The myth of Mao Zedong and modern insurgency[electronic resource] /by Francis Grice. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2019. - xi, 219 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.

1. Introduction -- 2. What Mao Actually Taught -- 3. The Unoriginal Mao -- 4. Mao and the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War -- 5. The Insignificant Mao -- 6. The Deification of Mao -- 7. Conclusion.

Tackling one of the most prevalent myths about insurgencies, this book examines and rebuts the popular belief that Mao Zedong created a fundamentally new form of warfare that transformed the nature of modern insurgency. The labeling of an insurgent enemy as using "Maoist Warfare" has been a common phenomenon since Mao's victory over the Guomindang in 1949, from Malaya and Vietnam during the Cold War to Afghanistan and Syria today. Yet, this practice is heavily flawed. This book argues that Mao did not invent a new breed of insurgency, failed to produce a coherent vision of how insurgencies should be fought, and was not influential in his impact upon subsequent insurgencies. Consequently, Mao's writings cannot be used to generate meaningful insights for understanding those insurgencies that came after him. This means that scholars and policymakers should stop using Mao as a tool for understanding insurgencies and as a straw man against whom to target counterinsurgency strategies. Francis Grice is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at McDaniel College, USA.

ISBN: 9783319775715

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-319-77571-5doiSubjects--Personal Names:

729571
Mao, Zedong,
1893-1976.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1990191
Insurgency
--History--China--20th century.Subjects--Geographical Terms:

622335
China
--History--1949-1976.

LC Class. No.: DS778.M3 / G69 2019

Dewey Class. No.: 951.05

The myth of Mao Zedong and modern insurgency
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300 $a xi, 219 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
505 0 $a 1. Introduction -- 2. What Mao Actually Taught -- 3. The Unoriginal Mao -- 4. Mao and the Chinese Revolutionary Civil War -- 5. The Insignificant Mao -- 6. The Deification of Mao -- 7. Conclusion.
520 $a Tackling one of the most prevalent myths about insurgencies, this book examines and rebuts the popular belief that Mao Zedong created a fundamentally new form of warfare that transformed the nature of modern insurgency. The labeling of an insurgent enemy as using "Maoist Warfare" has been a common phenomenon since Mao's victory over the Guomindang in 1949, from Malaya and Vietnam during the Cold War to Afghanistan and Syria today. Yet, this practice is heavily flawed. This book argues that Mao did not invent a new breed of insurgency, failed to produce a coherent vision of how insurgencies should be fought, and was not influential in his impact upon subsequent insurgencies. Consequently, Mao's writings cannot be used to generate meaningful insights for understanding those insurgencies that came after him. This means that scholars and policymakers should stop using Mao as a tool for understanding insurgencies and as a straw man against whom to target counterinsurgency strategies. Francis Grice is Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Studies at McDaniel College, USA.
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