東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Complexity in Procurement Decision M...

Quiroga Gomez, Bernardo F.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Complexity in Procurement Decision Making.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Complexity in Procurement Decision Making./
Author:	Quiroga Gomez, Bernardo F.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
Description:	77 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-04A(E).
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10666605
ISBN:	9780355331479

Complexity in Procurement Decision Making.
Quiroga Gomez, Bernardo F.

Complexity in Procurement Decision Making. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 77 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2017.

In the first essay, we investigate the effect of observed inventory decisions on firm performance. In particular, our goal is to measure and understand how much profit a newsvendor-type of decision maker stands to lose due to behavioral (intuitive but suboptimal) ordering. The current literature, primarily focused on a newsvendor making decisions in isolation, reports results which imply profit losses of 1-.5% when compared to the analytical solution, due to the flatness of the profit curve in the neighborhood of the optimum. In contrast, we show that in a practical situation, when a behavioral inventory decision-maker competes against a management-science-driven competitor, profit losses arc orders of magnitude larger. By considering several plausible and simple competitor policies, we demonstrate average profit losses between 22-76%, regardless of policy sophistication or embedded assumptions. Our results send a dear message to business executives and highlight the importance of considering behavioral biases in procurement.

ISBN: 9780355331479Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Complexity in Procurement Decision Making.
LDR:03262nmm a2200325 4500 001 2164012
005 20181026115417.5
008 190424s2017 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9780355331479
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10666605
035 $a AAI10666605
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Quiroga Gomez, Bernardo F. $3 3352041
245 1 0 $a Complexity in Procurement Decision Making.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2017
300 $a 77 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: V. Daniel R. Guide, Jr.; Brent B. Moritz.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2017.
520 $a In the first essay, we investigate the effect of observed inventory decisions on firm performance. In particular, our goal is to measure and understand how much profit a newsvendor-type of decision maker stands to lose due to behavioral (intuitive but suboptimal) ordering. The current literature, primarily focused on a newsvendor making decisions in isolation, reports results which imply profit losses of 1-.5% when compared to the analytical solution, due to the flatness of the profit curve in the neighborhood of the optimum. In contrast, we show that in a practical situation, when a behavioral inventory decision-maker competes against a management-science-driven competitor, profit losses arc orders of magnitude larger. By considering several plausible and simple competitor policies, we demonstrate average profit losses between 22-76%, regardless of policy sophistication or embedded assumptions. Our results send a dear message to business executives and highlight the importance of considering behavioral biases in procurement.
520 $a In the second essay, we study the econometric identification of multi-attribute score auctions. Governmental agencies use score procurement auctions to incorporate other attributes beyond price in their purchase decisions. We establish nonparametric identification of bidders' independent private (pseudo )types for multi-attribute procurement where bids are evaluated using a preannounced quasi-linear-score, calculated on the basis of the submitted levels of the attributes. Hence, it is possible to extend the standard non parametric method for independent private costs sealed-bid-first-price auctions to multi-attribute score auctions by incorporating the optimal bidding structure.
520 $a In the third essay, we analyse bidding behavior in two closely related sealed-bid scenarios: One where the rule to assign the contract is transparently communicated to bidders before they submit their offers (the score auction analy7.ed in the preceding essay), and another where the assignment rule is only known to the buyer and not to the bidders (what we have called a ''multi-dimensional beauty-contest auction"). Our results show substantial losses in terms of social welfare and buyer surplus as a direct effect of transparency loss in this procurement system.
590 $a School code: 0176.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 4 $a Management. $3 516664
650 4 $a Behavioral sciences. $3 529833
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0454
690 $a 0602
710 2 $a The Pennsylvania State University. $3 699896
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-04A(E).
790 $a 0176
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2017
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10666605