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Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights...

Li, Nan.

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Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions./
Author:	Li, Nan.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
Description:	80 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-09A(E).
Subject:	Accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10810592
ISBN:	9780355916195

Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions.
Li, Nan.

Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 80 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-09(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Columbia University, 2018.

In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions (RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. At the same time, it is well recognized that RPTs can help firms overcome market shortcomings. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, I find that a mandatory and binding shareholder voting mechanism helps filter out expropriation. Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions, resulting in substantial shareholder dissent. My difference-in-difference analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a significant deterrence effect on RPT volume, especially on financial RPTs. I also find that stock prices react positively to news signaling the passage of the voting rule, and that the association between firm profitability and RPT increases following rule's adoption, suggesting that rule has a positive effect on shareholder value. Lastly, I show that mandatory RPT voting makes Indian firms more attractive to foreign institutional investors.

ISBN: 9780355916195Subjects--Topical Terms:

557516
Accounting.

Do Greater Shareholder Voting Rights Reduce Expropriation? Evidence from Related Party Transactions.
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520 $a In the presence of business groups, the expropriation through related party transactions (RPTs) is common and costly to minority shareholders. At the same time, it is well recognized that RPTs can help firms overcome market shortcomings. Using the setting of India's RPT voting rule, I find that a mandatory and binding shareholder voting mechanism helps filter out expropriation. Minority shareholders actively raise their voice against RPT resolutions, resulting in substantial shareholder dissent. My difference-in-difference analysis reveals that shareholder voting has a significant deterrence effect on RPT volume, especially on financial RPTs. I also find that stock prices react positively to news signaling the passage of the voting rule, and that the association between firm profitability and RPT increases following rule's adoption, suggesting that rule has a positive effect on shareholder value. Lastly, I show that mandatory RPT voting makes Indian firms more attractive to foreign institutional investors.
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