東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Global Climate Justice and Individua...

Hickey, Colin J.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Global Climate Justice and Individual Duties.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Global Climate Justice and Individual Duties./
作者:	Hickey, Colin J.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	183 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-04A(E).
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10636282
ISBN:	9780355361872

Global Climate Justice and Individual Duties.
Hickey, Colin J.

Global Climate Justice and Individual Duties. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 183 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2017.

In this dissertation I develop an account of the morality of climate change. As a moral problem that is a function of the aggregation of many seemingly innocuous individual actions, climate change is in significant tension with the traditional model of individual responsibility. In response to this tension, and in light of the struggles of alternative strategies, I suggest that the most promising way forward is to pursue a particular kind of theory of global distributive justice, which frames climate change as a moral problem regarding the overuse of a scarce, valuable, rival, non-excludable global resource that no one owns, the earth's atmospheric absorptive capacity (AAC). Such an approach is uniquely suited to accomplish a number of important tasks of an adequate theory of climate morality in a unified way; namely, it can recognize the importance of collective institutions, capture the distribution of collective institutional responsibility, and explain pre-institutional responsibilities and their relationship to collective institutional responsibility. After clearing the groundwork for such a theory of global distributive justice I begin to fill it out by arguing that individuals are, pre-institutionally, bound as a matter of global distributive justice to restrict their use, or benefit from the use, of AAC to within a specified justifiable range and that this serves as the normative basis for what distributively just global institutions to govern climate change would look like in allocating access to that resource and its benefits. I further defend an account of the individual duty to participate in the creation of just climate institutions, what I also refer to as the duty to collectivize.

ISBN: 9780355361872Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Global Climate Justice and Individual Duties.
LDR:02684nmm a2200313 4500 001 2163174
005 20181022132218.5
008 190424s2017 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9780355361872
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10636282
035 $a (MiAaPQ)georgetown:13806
035 $a AAI10636282
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Hickey, Colin J. $3 3351190
245 1 0 $a Global Climate Justice and Individual Duties.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2017
300 $a 183 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-04(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Margaret O. Little; Madison Powers.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgetown University, 2017.
520 $a In this dissertation I develop an account of the morality of climate change. As a moral problem that is a function of the aggregation of many seemingly innocuous individual actions, climate change is in significant tension with the traditional model of individual responsibility. In response to this tension, and in light of the struggles of alternative strategies, I suggest that the most promising way forward is to pursue a particular kind of theory of global distributive justice, which frames climate change as a moral problem regarding the overuse of a scarce, valuable, rival, non-excludable global resource that no one owns, the earth's atmospheric absorptive capacity (AAC). Such an approach is uniquely suited to accomplish a number of important tasks of an adequate theory of climate morality in a unified way; namely, it can recognize the importance of collective institutions, capture the distribution of collective institutional responsibility, and explain pre-institutional responsibilities and their relationship to collective institutional responsibility. After clearing the groundwork for such a theory of global distributive justice I begin to fill it out by arguing that individuals are, pre-institutionally, bound as a matter of global distributive justice to restrict their use, or benefit from the use, of AAC to within a specified justifiable range and that this serves as the normative basis for what distributively just global institutions to govern climate change would look like in allocating access to that resource and its benefits. I further defend an account of the individual duty to participate in the creation of just climate institutions, what I also refer to as the duty to collectivize.
590 $a School code: 0076.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Environmental justice. $3 528369
650 4 $a Climate change. $2 bicssc $3 2079509
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0619
690 $a 0404
710 2 $a Georgetown University. $b Philosophy. $3 2104300
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-04A(E).
790 $a 0076
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2017
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10636282