東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays in Dynamic Games and Market D...

Kuvalekar, Aditya.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays in Dynamic Games and Market Design.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Dynamic Games and Market Design./
作者:	Kuvalekar, Aditya.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	187 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-01A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10260670
ISBN:	9780355128093

Essays in Dynamic Games and Market Design.
Kuvalekar, Aditya.

Essays in Dynamic Games and Market Design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 187 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2017.

This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first chapter (joint with Rumen Kostadinov), we study relational contracts between a principal and an agent when they face symmetric uncertainty about the match quality. Actions affect learning about the match quality and the principal's payoffs. Because the agent's actions are perfectly observable, the agent cannot bias the principal's beliefs. We show that even when the agent is not protected by limited liability and despite the absence of private information and hidden action, uncertainty about match quality precludes efficiency. The source of inefficiency is the holdup problem arising out of the separation between the entity exerting effort and the entity collecting the output. We characterize the set of all subgame perfect equilibria of the associated game. We show that Pareto Optimal equilibria may involve actions that are dominated in their informational content as well as payoff. Such actions are a modest way for the principal to provide incentives and learn about the match quality, when more efficient ways are not credible. Conditional upon strong performance, we show that the relationships move to a phase where actions that offer better learning and higher payoff are used. In this phase the agent is rewarded with a bonus upon strong performance.

ISBN: 9780355128093Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays in Dynamic Games and Market Design.
LDR:04343nmm a2200325 4500 001 2158290
005 20180608130008.5
008 190424s2017 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9780355128093
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10260670
035 $a (MiAaPQ)nyu:12894
035 $a AAI10260670
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Kuvalekar, Aditya. $3 3346111
245 1 0 $a Essays in Dynamic Games and Market Design.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2017
300 $a 187 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Ennio Stacchetti.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2017.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three essays. In the first chapter (joint with Rumen Kostadinov), we study relational contracts between a principal and an agent when they face symmetric uncertainty about the match quality. Actions affect learning about the match quality and the principal's payoffs. Because the agent's actions are perfectly observable, the agent cannot bias the principal's beliefs. We show that even when the agent is not protected by limited liability and despite the absence of private information and hidden action, uncertainty about match quality precludes efficiency. The source of inefficiency is the holdup problem arising out of the separation between the entity exerting effort and the entity collecting the output. We characterize the set of all subgame perfect equilibria of the associated game. We show that Pareto Optimal equilibria may involve actions that are dominated in their informational content as well as payoff. Such actions are a modest way for the principal to provide incentives and learn about the match quality, when more efficient ways are not credible. Conditional upon strong performance, we show that the relationships move to a phase where actions that offer better learning and higher payoff are used. In this phase the agent is rewarded with a bonus upon strong performance.
520 $a In the second chapter (joint with Elliot Lipnowski), we examine the effect of job insecurity on productivity. We study a fixed wage relationship between a firm and a worker in which neither knows how well-suited the worker is to the job. The worker decides the level of effort, a choice that affects both learning and the firm's bottom line. The employer, seeing the worker's effort choice and outcome, decides whether or not to continue employing the worker. The employer cannot commit to retain the worker when she becomes pessimistic enough about the match quality. We show that, rather than aligning interests, this threat creates a perverse incentive not to attract attention: the worker strategically slows learning, harming productivity. As the firm anticipates this, job insecurity can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. We explicitly characterize the unique Markov perfect equilibrium in our continuous time dynamic game. Consistent with empirical evidence in organizational psychology, equilibrium exhibits a U-shaped relationship between job insecurity and productivity: a worker is least productive when his job is moderately secure.
520 $a In the third chapter, I study a classical two-sided marriage market with a concern for fairness. The celebrated Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DAA) due to Gale & Shapley always produces an extremal matching by favoring one side of the market at the expense of the other. This favoritism arises because, in DAA, only one side makes proposals. I propose a new algorithm wherein both sides of the market propose in a manner similar to the DAA. The proposed algorithm always yields a stable matching. Moreover, the outcome is often a non-extremal matching. Additionally, the algorithm does not distinguish (ex-ante) between men and women at any stage. The ex-post distinction arises primarily because in every round potential cycles are formed, that are broken arbitrarily. Lastly, the algorithm can be computed in polynomial time and hence, from a practical standpoint, can be used in markets where fairness considerations are important.
590 $a School code: 0146.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0501
710 2 $a New York University. $b Economics. $3 1032403
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 79-01A(E).
790 $a 0146
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2017
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10260670