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Essays on Information, Search and Pr...

Dai, Yifan.

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Essays on Information, Search and Pricing.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Information, Search and Pricing./
作者:	Dai, Yifan.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	180 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-12A(E).
標題:	Economic theory. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10283147
ISBN:	9780355244151

Essays on Information, Search and Pricing.
Dai, Yifan.

Essays on Information, Search and Pricing. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 180 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2017.

This dissertation consists of three essays in microeconomic theory with an emphasis on consumer search and strategic experimentation. Among many issues, I shed some lights on search frictions, commitment and information.

ISBN: 9780355244151Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays on Information, Search and Pricing.
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500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Kyungmin Kim.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Iowa, 2017.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three essays in microeconomic theory with an emphasis on consumer search and strategic experimentation. Among many issues, I shed some lights on search frictions, commitment and information.
520 $a In Chapter 1, we consider an oligopoly model in which consumers engage in sequential search based on partial product information and advertised prices. We derive a simple condition that fully summarizes consumers' shopping outcomes and use the condition to reformulate the pricing game among the sellers as a familiar discrete-choice problem. Exploiting the reformulation, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the existence and uniqueness of pure-strategy market equilibrium and obtain several novel insights about the effects of search frictions on market prices. Among others, we show that a reduction in search costs increases market prices, but providing more pre-search information raises market prices if and only if there are sufficiently many sellers.
520 $a In Chapter 2, I study the effects of limited price commitment on consumer search and optimal pricing. I consider an environment in which consumers are uncertain about a seller's commitment to the advertised price. I characterize the set of pure-strategy equilibria and find that a higher degree of commitment is beneficial to the consumers. I evaluate the effects of regulation that limits the extent of a seller's deviation from the advertised price and demonstrate that stricter regulation may not be welfare improving. I also consider the case where sellers have heterogeneous levels of commitment power and investigate how the difference in commitment power influences market outcomes. I find that a higher degree of commitment does not direct consumers' search order when all sellers have limited commitment. Conversely, full commitment allows a seller to dictate consumers' visit when his rivals have limited commitment. Finally, I show that the impact of search costs on prices depends on the level of commitment, the magnitude of the search cost and whether consumers have ex-ante heterogenous valuations of the product.
520 $a In Chapter 3, we consider a two-player exit game in which each player faces a one-armed bandit problem and the two players' types are negatively correlated. We provide a closed-form characterization of the unique (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of the game. We show that, in stark contrast to the case of positive correlation, the players exit the game at an increasing rate over time and one player exits for sure before a deterministic time.
590 $a School code: 0096.
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710 2 $a The University of Iowa. $b Economics. $3 1022879
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792 $a 2017
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10283147