東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Simple Mechanisms and Behavioral Age...

Pountourakis, Emmanouil.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Simple Mechanisms and Behavioral Agents: Towards a Theory of Realistic Mechanism Design.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Simple Mechanisms and Behavioral Agents: Towards a Theory of Realistic Mechanism Design./
Author:	Pountourakis, Emmanouil.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
Description:	149 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-08(E), Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-08B(E).
Subject:	Computer science. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10258809
ISBN:	9781369679427

Simple Mechanisms and Behavioral Agents: Towards a Theory of Realistic Mechanism Design.
Pountourakis, Emmanouil.

Simple Mechanisms and Behavioral Agents: Towards a Theory of Realistic Mechanism Design. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 149 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-08(E), Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2017.

Classic mechanism design studies the implementation of optimal systems or processes in the presence of multiple selfish and fully rational agents. The theory of mechanism design has been one of the most celebrated advances in the economics discipline, especially with regards to auctions Myerson (1981),Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973). Nevertheless, practical applications of mechanism design show a significant disconnect between theory and practice. For instance, anonymous second price auction and pricing is one of the most prevalent forms of online auctions despite what the theory of Myerson (1981) suggests for asymmetric environments, e.g. eBay auctions where bidding history and demographic information provides a very specific information to the seller. On another note, most behavioral experiments indicate that the agent behavior diverges from the rational agent model, especially in dynamic environments.

ISBN: 9781369679427Subjects--Topical Terms:

523869
Computer science.

Simple Mechanisms and Behavioral Agents: Towards a Theory of Realistic Mechanism Design.
LDR:02876nmm a2200301 4500 001 2126238
005 20171128071847.5
008 180830s2017 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781369679427
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI10258809
035 $a AAI10258809
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Pountourakis, Emmanouil. $3 3288331
245 1 0 $a Simple Mechanisms and Behavioral Agents: Towards a Theory of Realistic Mechanism Design.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2017
300 $a 149 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-08(E), Section: B.
500 $a Adviser: Nicole Immorlica.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2017.
520 $a Classic mechanism design studies the implementation of optimal systems or processes in the presence of multiple selfish and fully rational agents. The theory of mechanism design has been one of the most celebrated advances in the economics discipline, especially with regards to auctions Myerson (1981),Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973). Nevertheless, practical applications of mechanism design show a significant disconnect between theory and practice. For instance, anonymous second price auction and pricing is one of the most prevalent forms of online auctions despite what the theory of Myerson (1981) suggests for asymmetric environments, e.g. eBay auctions where bidding history and demographic information provides a very specific information to the seller. On another note, most behavioral experiments indicate that the agent behavior diverges from the rational agent model, especially in dynamic environments.
520 $a This thesis addresses this phenomenon by studying simple, widely prevalent auctions like anonymous pricing and developing and analyzing them through the lens of the theory of approximation. The first contribution involves the problem of selling a single to agents with independent but non-identically distributed values. We show that anonymous pricing is a constant approximation to the optimal auction. Our second contributions involves repeated sales of a non-durable good. There, economic theory suggests that in the absence of commitment power the seller generates no revenue. Our contribution was to construct an equilibrium for multiple buyers where the seller is constraint to not discriminate with constant revenue approximation. Finally, this thesis considers the incorporation of a behavioral model, particularly a model for procrastination: present-bias. We introduce the notion of variable present bias and analyze the performance loss of a procrastination agent versus a rational counterpart.
590 $a School code: 0163.
650 4 $a Computer science. $3 523869
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
690 $a 0984
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a Northwestern University. $b Computer Science. $3 1019334
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-08B(E).
790 $a 0163
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2017
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10258809