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Essays on Corporate Governance.

Wang, Shuai.

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Essays on Corporate Governance.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on Corporate Governance./
作者:	Wang, Shuai.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	96 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-10A(E).
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10273659
ISBN:	9781369794458

Essays on Corporate Governance.
Wang, Shuai.

Essays on Corporate Governance. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 96 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Temple University, 2017.

Recent literature provide widespread and robust evidence on the impact of corporate governance. Ownership structure and management characteristics are among the center of the debate. Empirical studies report conflicting evidence regarding the information environment of public family-controlled firms. We use staggered exogenous shocks to the information environment to test whether family control influences corporate disclosure. After an exogenous decrease in the information environment, we find that family firms provide greater, more informative, and more rapidly produced disclosures than their nonfamily peer firms. Family control increases the likelihood of voluntary disclosure by 190% relative to nonfamily firms after a negative information shock. These disclosure increases occur across founder-, descendant-, and externally- led family firms, suggesting families possess strong incentives to protect the firm's information environment. Beyond ownership structure, I examine the relation of CEO overconfidence on compensation incentive. My findings suggest that the cost-reduction hypothesis applies when firms offer higher incentive to overconfident CEOs to exploit their positively biased views of firm performance; risk-reduction hypothesis dominates when CEOs are extremely overconfident, where firms offer reduced compensation convexity to lower CEO's excessive risk-taking incentive. Extremely overconfident CEOs receive less convex compensation than moderately overconfident CEOs and this relation amplifies with history of value-destroying acquisition and better corporate governance.

ISBN: 9781369794458Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.

Essays on Corporate Governance.
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