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Corporate governance and hedge fund ...

Goodwin, Shane.

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Corporate governance and hedge fund activism.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Corporate governance and hedge fund activism./
作者:	Goodwin, Shane.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2015,
面頁冊數:	297 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-11A(E).
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10140676
ISBN:	9781339960722

Corporate governance and hedge fund activism.
Goodwin, Shane.

Corporate governance and hedge fund activism. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015 - 297 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Oklahoma State University, 2015.

Over the past two decades, hedge fund activism has emerged as a new mechanism of corporate governance that brings about operational, financial and governance reforms to a corporation. Many prominent business executives and legal scholars are convinced that the American economy will suffer unless hedge fund activism with its perceived short-termism agenda is significantly restricted. Shareholder activists and their proponents claim they function as a disciplinary mechanism to monitor management and are instrumental in mitigating the agency conflict between managers and shareholders. I find statistically meaningful empirical evidence to reject the anecdotal conventional wisdom that hedge fund activism is detrimental to the long term interests of companies and their long term shareholders. Moreover, my findings suggest that hedge funds generate substantial long term value for target firms and its long term shareholders when they function as a shareholder advocate to monitor management through active board engagement..

ISBN: 9781339960722Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.

Corporate governance and hedge fund activism.
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