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Epistemic considerations on extensiv...

Tasdemir, Cagil.

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Epistemic considerations on extensive-form games.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Epistemic considerations on extensive-form games./
作者:	Tasdemir, Cagil.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
面頁冊數:	101 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-07(E), Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-07B(E).
標題:	Computer science. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10009830
ISBN:	9781339462318

Epistemic considerations on extensive-form games.
Tasdemir, Cagil.

Epistemic considerations on extensive-form games. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 101 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-07(E), Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--City University of New York, 2016.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

In this thesis, we study several topics in extensive-form games. First, we consider perfect information games with belief revision with players who are tolerant of each other's hypothetical errors. We bound the number of hypothetical non-rational moves of a player that will be tolerated by other players without revising the belief on that player's rationality on future moves, and investigate which games yield the backward induction solution.

ISBN: 9781339462318Subjects--Topical Terms:

523869
Computer science.

Epistemic considerations on extensive-form games.
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500 $a Adviser: Sergei Artemov.
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506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
520 $a In this thesis, we study several topics in extensive-form games. First, we consider perfect information games with belief revision with players who are tolerant of each other's hypothetical errors. We bound the number of hypothetical non-rational moves of a player that will be tolerated by other players without revising the belief on that player's rationality on future moves, and investigate which games yield the backward induction solution.
520 $a Second, we consider players who have no way of assigning probabilities to various possible outcomes, and define players as conservative, moderate and aggressive depending on the way they choose, and show that all such players could be considered rational.
520 $a We then concentrate on games with imperfect and incomplete information and study how conservative, moderate and aggressive players might play such games. We provide models for the behavior of a (truthful) knowledge manipulator whose motives are not known to the active players, and look into how she can bring about a certain knowledge situation about a game, and change the way the game will be played.
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