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Investor-State Dispute Settlement an...

Phanord-Cadet, Madwa-Nika.

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Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the Regulatory Autonomy of Host States: An Analysis Through the Effect of ISDS on Foreign Direct Investment.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the Regulatory Autonomy of Host States: An Analysis Through the Effect of ISDS on Foreign Direct Investment./
Author:	Phanord-Cadet, Madwa-Nika.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
Description:	51 p.
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 56-04.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International56-04(E).
Subject:	Public policy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10267934
ISBN:	9781369710410

Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the Regulatory Autonomy of Host States: An Analysis Through the Effect of ISDS on Foreign Direct Investment.
Phanord-Cadet, Madwa-Nika.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the Regulatory Autonomy of Host States: An Analysis Through the Effect of ISDS on Foreign Direct Investment. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 51 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 56-04.

Thesis (M.P.P.)--Georgetown University, 2017.

This paper studies how the dispute resolution model currently institutionalized in the vast majority of international investment agreements (IIAs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) may affect states' ability and leeway to legislate and regulate in the public interest. To explore this topic through quantitative methods, this paper elaborates on the empirically testable hypothesis that being an unreliable host state through involvement in the institution of investment arbitration decreases foreign direct investment inflows (FDIs). I test this hypothesis during the year of initiation of cases against host countries and during subsequent years, verify if the outcome of original proceedings, i.e. the number of cases decided in favor of the state or the investor in any given year, substantially affects my dependent variable, and assess the differential effect of low-income, middle-income or high-income countries. I create a panel of 109 developed and developing countries, covering the 1993 to 2015 period, using data extracted from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Bank. I find that, for all the countries that have been a respondent party in investor-state dispute settlement, a positive statistically significant relationship between this variable and investment inflows can be observed during the year of initiation of cases, potentially showing confidence in an effective and credible international court system. On the year the award was promulgated, cases decided in favor of investors still show a statistically significant positive relationship, while cases decided in favor of states significantly decrease foreign direct investment, controlling for economic explanatory variables. For lower developed countries in my sample, being an unreliable host state through involvement in the institution of investment arbitration does decrease foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, even on the year of initiation of the case, and this relationship is statistically significant. Since ISDS has been incorporated in international investment agreements to protect investors doing business in countries with weaker institutions, those results could give substance to the view that lower-income countries need to worry more about their regulatory sovereignty than higher-income countries with broader economic leverage that violate their obligations.

ISBN: 9781369710410Subjects--Topical Terms:

532803
Public policy.

Investor-State Dispute Settlement and the Regulatory Autonomy of Host States: An Analysis Through the Effect of ISDS on Foreign Direct Investment.
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