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A study of the changes of agricultur...

Lai, Shian-Lung Reinhard.

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A study of the changes of agricultural productivity induced by the Chinese rural institutional reform: The adoption of the Household Responsibility System.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	A study of the changes of agricultural productivity induced by the Chinese rural institutional reform: The adoption of the Household Responsibility System./
作者:	Lai, Shian-Lung Reinhard.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 1992,
面頁冊數:	257 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 53-09, Section: A, page: 3310.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International53-09A.
標題:	Agricultural economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9303509

A study of the changes of agricultural productivity induced by the Chinese rural institutional reform: The adoption of the Household Responsibility System.
Lai, Shian-Lung Reinhard.

A study of the changes of agricultural productivity induced by the Chinese rural institutional reform: The adoption of the Household Responsibility System. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 1992 - 257 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 53-09, Section: A, page: 3310.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New School for Social Research, 1992.

Since 1978, China has embarked a series of economic reform policies and programs. The most notable ones are those which decollectivize the communes and replace the collective system with an individual household farming approach called the Household Responsibility System (HRS). The implications of such an institutional shift are tremendous. Inside China, there is a view that the commune system has not been that successful as numerous scholars outside China have thought. A review of the literature reveals when the co-operative income is distributed on a per-labor-input basis and when the behavior of labor emulation exists, the work incentives of a member in that co-operative will reach the optimum value. Also, effective labor monitoring is required to guarantee an adequate supply of labor effort in the production process. The hypothesis to be tested here is: the HRS induces higher work incentives, thus, it has resulted in higher agricultural productivity, particularly that of labor, than does the original collective farming approach.Subjects--Topical Terms:

3172150
Agricultural economics.

A study of the changes of agricultural productivity induced by the Chinese rural institutional reform: The adoption of the Household Responsibility System.
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245 1 2 $a A study of the changes of agricultural productivity induced by the Chinese rural institutional reform: The adoption of the Household Responsibility System.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 1992
300 $a 257 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 53-09, Section: A, page: 3310.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New School for Social Research, 1992.
520 $a Since 1978, China has embarked a series of economic reform policies and programs. The most notable ones are those which decollectivize the communes and replace the collective system with an individual household farming approach called the Household Responsibility System (HRS). The implications of such an institutional shift are tremendous. Inside China, there is a view that the commune system has not been that successful as numerous scholars outside China have thought. A review of the literature reveals when the co-operative income is distributed on a per-labor-input basis and when the behavior of labor emulation exists, the work incentives of a member in that co-operative will reach the optimum value. Also, effective labor monitoring is required to guarantee an adequate supply of labor effort in the production process. The hypothesis to be tested here is: the HRS induces higher work incentives, thus, it has resulted in higher agricultural productivity, particularly that of labor, than does the original collective farming approach.
520 $a We have assumed a Cobb-Douglas production function to represent the Chinese agricultural production relationship, based upon which, regression equations are derived and estimated. The novelty of our regression analyses is that the effect of the shift from collectives to the household farming is explicitly estimated, based upon sets of cross-sectional data. The results of the regression analyses support what the hypothesis has stipulated.
520 $a In three or four years after the adoption of the new system, the agricultural production had increased and the rural income had become significantly higher. However, problems concerning further growth also surfaced. The question of the sustainability of the agricultural growth is examined. In conclusion, we also comment on two aspects: first, the conflict of administrative controls and market operations; and, second, the contradictory policies adopted by the government.
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