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Existential threats and the militari...
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Sanders, Ottawa T.
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Existential threats and the militarization of minor powers: Why leaders choose to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons and why some give them up whereas others do not.
紀錄類型:
書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:
Existential threats and the militarization of minor powers: Why leaders choose to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons and why some give them up whereas others do not./
作者:
Sanders, Ottawa T.
出版者:
Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:
256 p.
附註:
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-08(E), Section: A.
Contained By:
Dissertation Abstracts International78-08A(E).
標題:
Political science. -
電子資源:
http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10260518
ISBN:
9781369664331
Existential threats and the militarization of minor powers: Why leaders choose to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons and why some give them up whereas others do not.
Sanders, Ottawa T.
Existential threats and the militarization of minor powers: Why leaders choose to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons and why some give them up whereas others do not.
- Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 256 p.
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-08(E), Section: A.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2017.
Why do leaders decide to pursue, acquire, and give up nuclear weapons; furthermore, why do some programs take longer to acquire nuclear weapons than others? I argue that minor power nuclearization is more likely to occur when the leadership perceives an existential threat to the security of the state. Drawing from the International Relations (IR) rivalry literature, I argue that the minor power's nuclear-armed rival and its behavior and nuclear strategy are important sources of existential threat. Minor power leaders are more prone to perceive an existential threat when its stronger rival does one or more of the following: intervenes as a third party participant in a strategic rivalry involving the minor power and a secondary rival, extends a nuclear deterrent to states in close proximity to the minor power, and deploys nuclear weapons on the soil of states close to the minor power. With respect to program duration, I argue that the interaction between technological and economic variables plays a role in determining the length of time (in years) states need to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, in terms of nuclear forbearance, I posit that a decline in perceived threat levels determines whether or not the leadership decides to dismantle its program and give up the state's nuclear arsenal. I recognize that threat perception, while the primary variable, may not necessarily be the only factor. Thus, I consider the saliency of regime effects and hegemonic pressures in accounting for nuclear forbearance. To examine my argument, I employ qualitative methods to analyze two cases: North Korea and South Africa. For both cases, I show that the behavior and nuclear strategy of their main enemy significantly increased the leaderships' threat levels, leading to the decision to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons. North Korea took seven times longer than South Africa to acquire nuclear weapons, partly because it lacked outside assistance. South Africa gave up the bomb, whereas North Korea still has a nuclear arsenal, since its leadership still perceives an existential threat to the state. However, in the case of South Africa, the threat no longer exists.
ISBN: 9781369664331Subjects--Topical Terms:
528916
Political science.
Existential threats and the militarization of minor powers: Why leaders choose to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons and why some give them up whereas others do not.
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Why do leaders decide to pursue, acquire, and give up nuclear weapons; furthermore, why do some programs take longer to acquire nuclear weapons than others? I argue that minor power nuclearization is more likely to occur when the leadership perceives an existential threat to the security of the state. Drawing from the International Relations (IR) rivalry literature, I argue that the minor power's nuclear-armed rival and its behavior and nuclear strategy are important sources of existential threat. Minor power leaders are more prone to perceive an existential threat when its stronger rival does one or more of the following: intervenes as a third party participant in a strategic rivalry involving the minor power and a secondary rival, extends a nuclear deterrent to states in close proximity to the minor power, and deploys nuclear weapons on the soil of states close to the minor power. With respect to program duration, I argue that the interaction between technological and economic variables plays a role in determining the length of time (in years) states need to acquire nuclear weapons. Finally, in terms of nuclear forbearance, I posit that a decline in perceived threat levels determines whether or not the leadership decides to dismantle its program and give up the state's nuclear arsenal. I recognize that threat perception, while the primary variable, may not necessarily be the only factor. Thus, I consider the saliency of regime effects and hegemonic pressures in accounting for nuclear forbearance. To examine my argument, I employ qualitative methods to analyze two cases: North Korea and South Africa. For both cases, I show that the behavior and nuclear strategy of their main enemy significantly increased the leaderships' threat levels, leading to the decision to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons. North Korea took seven times longer than South Africa to acquire nuclear weapons, partly because it lacked outside assistance. South Africa gave up the bomb, whereas North Korea still has a nuclear arsenal, since its leadership still perceives an existential threat to the state. However, in the case of South Africa, the threat no longer exists.
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http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10260518
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